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ABSTRACT 
Regional powers, their roles, and places in the future configuration of the new 
world order have been burning debates in academia. Yet, studies on regional powers’ 
projections in certain regions are quite rare both empirically and theoretically. 
Needless to say, regional powers have been gaining increasing importance in their 
respective regions that are gradually becoming autonomous. This creates an 
environment for them to assert their regional projections. Yet, in this responding region, 
there might be more than one regional power whose regional projections would 
possibly contradict each other due to their foreign policy considerations. In this thesis, I 
demonstrate how two different foreign policy oriented regional powers approach 
crucially important unfolding regional developments, by examining Saudi Arabia and 
Turkey during the Arab Spring. By accepting their leadership roles at that period, their 
intentions and implementations are compared and analyzed in the context of regional 
powers.  
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ÖZET 
Bölgesel güçler, rolleri ve gelecekteki yeni dünya düzenindeki yerleri akademide 
yoğun sekilde tartışılmaktadır. Fakat, belirli bölgeler üzerine bölgesel güçlerin 
projeksiyonları hakkındaki teorik ve ampirik çalışmalar nadirdir. Bölgesel güçler 
gittikçe otonomlaşan bölgelerinde artarak önem kazanmaktadır. Bu onlara, bölgesel 
projeksiyonlarını öne çıkarmak için bir ortam sunmaktadır. Ancak, bu bölgelerde dış 
politika değerlendirmeleri çeşitli nedenlerden dolayı bölgesel projeksiyonlarında 
birbirleriyle zıt olan birden fazla bölgesel güç olabilir. Bu tezde, Arap Baharı süresince 
Türkiye ve Suudi Arabistan göz önüne alınarak iki farklı dış politika anlayışına sahip 
olan iki bölgesel gücün bölgeye yayılan hayati derecede önemli gelişmelere nasıl 
yaklaştıkları sorgulanmaktadır. Ayrıca, bu ülkelerin Arap Baharı boyunca liderlikleri 
varsayılarak, bahsedilen süre içerisindeki niyetleri ve uygulamaları karşılaştırılarak, 
bölgesel güçler bağlamında analiz edilmiştir. 
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1.INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Regional powers, their roles and places in the future configuration of the new world 
order have been burning debates in academia in the last decades. Apart from the 
traditional middle and great power actors, when we glance at the emerging middle 
powers and great powers, it is not unusual to be faced their regional power 
characteristics. Even though their role in world politics as regional powers has been the 
main subject of most of the academic studies, the analysis of regional powers’ regional 
projections is quite rare.  
To enrich both theoretical and empirical analyze is a must situation in this context. 
Theoretically, Sandra Destradi focuses on three strategies that regional powers could 
implement in their foreign policy. Destradi (2010) points out the three approaches of 
empire, hegemony and leadership with the help of IR theories main assumptions in 
order to fill the gap of explaining how regional powers design their interests to 
neighboring countries in responding regions. These theoretical discussions should be 
propped up with empirical analysis to better understand both regional powers’ 
intentions and capabilities as well as to demonstrate their regional limitations, if they 
exist.  
In this thesis, theoretically, two leading regional powers, namely Turkey and Saudi 
Arabia, will be taken into account in the period of the Arab Spring and will be used to 
demonstrate how two different foreign policy based actors in the region of polarity acts 
to regionally influential unfolding developments. Thus, the main problem with most of 
the studies is that they focus solely on the regional powers’ role in the region by ruling 
out the rival regional powers in the region. Hence, we will examine how two leaderships 
with different foreign policy orientations influence the regional cooperation or 
competition in multi-polar region. 
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 Why are Saudi Arabia and Turkey the main concern of this study?  Firstly, there 
have been numerous academic studies comparing Saudi Arabia and Iran or Turkey and 
Iran. However, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have rarely been the subject of a single 
literature. Furthermore, as two emerging and regional powers that are also US allies and 
Sunni majority actors, it will be interesting to compare these countries’ approaches 
toward the regionally influential wave of the Arab Spring.  
 In the first chapter, I will be delving into power analysis in the International 
Relations without getting into much detail. Then, we will draw the definition of a 
regional power as an actor with its main characteristics and demonstrate their place in 
current discussions. Following this, I will analyze in gradually being autonomous 
regions, which regional projections can be asserted will be analyzed with the help of 
Sandra Destradi’s illuminating study. Therefore, I will touch upon why I have chosen 
Saudi Arabia and Turkey as the two leaders of the region.  
In the second and third chapters, I will focus on regional powers resources of Saudi 
Arabia and Turkey by drawing on economic, diplomatic, military and ideational 
resources. Their leadership methods and foreign policy considerations will also be taken 
into account in order to grasp why their ways differentiated during the Arab Spring. In 
the fourth chapter, the challenge between Saudi Arabia and Turkey will be 
demonstrated over Bahrain, Egypt and Syria. By analyzing strong political figures 
statements together looking at the implementations of two actors in these countries, the 
divergence between Saudi Arabia and Turkey will be displayed.     
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CHAPTER 2 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1. Power Analysis in International Relations 
 
In social sciences, concept of power has always been the central focus of burning 
debates in particularly international relations and political sciences but it is still also 
most ambiguous one. Myriad attributions to power inevitably lead to diversification of 
viewpoints on power which makes it harder to find convergence of mutually confessed 
conceptualization, as well. Having no common and mutually admitted definition of 
power is even signified as “embarrassment to political scientist” by Robert Gilpin. 
(Gilpin, 1975, 24) It is inherent repercussions of how different International Relations 
theories take power into account with their main assumptions and of how interactions 
among the actors have steadily shifted that gradually made power analysis very 
complicated. In this context, power has been termed as “influence, coercion, force, 
persuasion, deterrence, compellence, inducement”(Baldwin, 2012) in which all reflects 
the different angles of power analysis. In current very complex environment of 
international relations, it is unreliable to analyze power by focusing on it as one 
dimension. 
David Luke, by analyzing Robert Dahl’s “observable” behavior and Peter Bachrach 
and Morton Baratz’s “agenda setting” oriented arguments, surfaces “three dimensions 
of power”. (Lukes, 1974) In his study, Lukes first points out the “observable” 
dimension of power in tandem with Dahl’s “observable” outcome oriented angle which 
is based causal relationship. In the second dimension of power, Luke focuses on the 
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decision-making based approach which is an actor’s ability to keep significant topics 
away from the discussion table. Finally, Luke comes up with the third dimension of 
power, which is “shaping” the interest of others. The difference between this third 
dimension and second is that third dimension of power is not only taken into account 
“behavioral” or “relational” but also it also pushes other actors to shape their 
maneuverability in terms of decision making resulting from international system’s 
structure.(Özdemir, 2008) 
With this very brief story of three dimensions of power, it is safe to say today 
power is simply multifaceted because international relations have gradually turned into 
a multi-dimensional concept which chipped away at classical power attribution to 
impose a personal will on another. That is not to say that Robert Dahl’s well known and 
almost most cited definition of “A has power over B to get the extent that he can get B 
to do something that B would not otherwise do”(Dahl, 1957) is passé. This implication 
of imposing political will on to another is still considerably valid. Yet, rapid 
developments in technology, social interaction, ecological concerns and most 
importantly economic considerations cause interdependence among states which 
requires each actor to some extent be dependent on each other but, a less dependent 
actor has more leverage of political influence to another.(Keohane and Nye, 1977) Both 
definitions signify the importance of outcome but the central focus of the first is 
“imposition” of a political will whereas latter is “interdependence”. In this regard, 
Holsti’s (Holsti, 1964)  emphasis on “power as an integral part of all political 
relationship” and questioning “how does one state influence the behavior of another in 
its own interests” are very complementary of the aforementioned power analysis. 
Hence, first, it recognizes the multidimensional version of power and second it specially 
emphasizes on having influence. In this thesis, by delving into the structural 
frameworks of power analysis, I will consider the power’s multifaceted dimension and 
its influence on actors by the employment of another one. Therefore, as a necessary part 
of my thesis in making more sense of benefitting the conceptualization of regional 
powers, I will specially split two parts for realist and liberal theories analysis of power.  
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2. 1.1. Realist Viewpoint of Power 
 
Realism is one of the most preeminent and influential tradition in international 
relations whose roots and marks trace back to ancient times. Realist theory firmly 
emphasizes that power, in particular, has a material side which is regarded as military 
might of a country. As a matter of fact, when looking at realist theory and power, the 
first thing that comes to an IR scholar’s mind is realist theory when power is mentioned 
which shows how intricately these two concepts are connected. 
Since the earlier times of ancient Greek era and its legendary narrative of Melian 
Dialogue to current times, security considerations which are very dependent on a 
country’s ability to secure its existence have been the main focus of realist theory. 
Thinking the collateral arising of international relations as a branch of political science 
with the intensification of realist studies in the beginning of 20th century, realists have 
been frontrunner conducive of shaping international relations discipline.  
Realist theory splits into two groups. First, for classic realists like pioneering 
scholar of Hans Morgenthau, with mentioning the nature of mankind and assuming that 
the human nature is not good so states, like in human nature, in international politics are 
not good. Therefore, Morgenthau (1973) considers international politics as “struggle for 
power” that made actors more deterrent to another one whose intention is both 
unforeseen and not good. In his approach to power, Morgenthau simultaneously 
considers power as both ultimate goal and tool to shape an actor’s interests in favor of 
itself.  
Morgenthau’s consideration of power as both aim and tool has been harshly 
slammed by constituting second group of realist school, namely neo-realism. By 
rejecting and standing away from the idea of human nature, Kenneth Waltz with its 
enlightening study of “Man, the State and War”, he points out international structure of 
politics in which there is no higher authority to control, judge and punish actors’ 
behavior and thereby international system is defined as anarchical.(Waltz, 2001) This 
international system breeds the need of power, which is entailed for having survival, 
stemming from anarchical environment, not deriving from human nature. Yet, here is 
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the most distinguishing feature of neo-realist theory and it is that power as a tool is 
needed to keep an actor’s survival, not emerging as an aim to reach.  
Although realist scholars are divided on this issue, there is a common point in 
which, for realists, power is tantamount to security and survival. Owing to this reason, 
realist theory and its fellows prioritize military might as main power source so as to be 
immune from any attacks. In addition to this, realist theorists focus on the economic 
dimension of power source by accepting that “the political clout of nations correlates 
closely with their economic power and military might”.(Waltz, 2010) After all, in power 
source hierarchy, military might of a country is located at the top and economic power 
continues subsequently.  
2.1.2. Liberal Viewpoint: Non-Material Side of Power 
 
The gradual complexities of international politics by steadily upholding importance 
of economic considerations resulting in the recognition of material side of power neither 
comprehensive nor is satisfactory explaining power as a whole, liberal scholars go 
beyond the security oriented view by confessing interdependence among countries bring 
in a concrete dimension to power within the scope of three dimensions of power 
developed by Steven Lukes. In this dimension, the application of power differs from the 
material and solid dimension by focusing on “agenda setting” ability of power whose 
observabilility is tough.  
In this context, inspiring study of Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz (1962) on 
“Two Faces of Power”, they point out the ability of hiding crucial points and confining 
the agenda favorably from the decision making table. Following this theoretical study, 
Joseph Nye has developed a more comprehensive and conceptually recognized 
approach of “soft power” with its tools and methodologies. As, Bachrach and Baratz put 
forward, Joseph Nye (1990) defines soft power as  “the ability of a county to structure a 
situation so that other countries develop preferences or define their interests in ways 
consistent with its own”. In shaping other actors’ preferences, threatening, coercing, 
inducing and several methods could be used but, for Nye, “attraction” is crucial to do 
so. The sources of soft power defined by Joseph Nye (2004) are lined up as “culture”, 
“political values” and “foreign policy” so as to enhance an actor’s attractiveness.  
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Contrary to realist theory’s state centered actor mechanism, liberal viewpoint not 
only takes state as a sole actor, but also private groups and even individuals are 
regarded as fundamental actor of international politics. (Moravcsik, 1997) Considering 
this together with Nye’s soft power tool of culture, as a main component part of cultural 
issues, individuals, social groups are automatically turned into collective actors 
increasing a country’s attractiveness.  
To sum up, by recognizing the “agenda setting” in which none of the significant 
issue is under probe and having “attraction” that enables an actor to be persuaded, 
results in power’s intangible dimension in which “soft power” occurs.   
2.1.3. Definition of Regional Powers as An Actor 
 
In order to grasp main characteristics of regional powers, we need to focus on two 
separate concepts: first, is geographic concept that indicates “region” and second 
concept is core issue of International relations, “power”.(Nolte, 2010) In addition to 
this, conceptualization of regional powers can be made with the help of different IR 
approaches; “they include the internal power base (liberal), the power resources (realist) 
and their application (realist), role definitions and strategies (constructivists)”.(Nolte, 
2010) By exploiting all abovementioned approaches and concepts, first, the concept of 
region and then concept of regional powers should be drawn. 
As a geographical concept, in international relations and political sciences, 
explanation of “region” has been usually ruled out and is rarely given place in the 
studies of regional powers. Although having lack of abundant definitions of “region”, 
there is widely accepted frame that has been drawn by William Thompson (1973), who 
indicates four main pillars for explaining the region; 
 geographical proximity 
 regularity and intensity of interaction between regional actors,  
 internal and external recognition as a distinctive area 
 a minimum size of at least two actors. 
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As understood from the definition, region is the internally and externally confined 
place in which at least two actors have regular and considerably intense interaction due 
to the help of geographical availability. Hence, an actor that has its own projections and 
contributions in a region is regarded as “regional powers”. Yet, being a regional power 
entails some criteria that aspiring countries should meet. In this context, Daniel Flames 
(2007) seeks to explain by relying on four criteria so as to explain the main pivotal 
necessities for being regional power. 
 
 Formulation of the claim to leadership, 
 Possession of the necessary power resources 
 Employment of foreign policy instruments 
 Acceptance of the leadership role by third states. 
 
First point demonstrates the leadership which is based on “willingness” of an actor 
is directly related with the internal base of power that allows a country to undertake 
crucial roles contributing adverse and positives impacts on upholding issues in the 
region. Second point emphasizes an ideational and material side of power which are 
conducive of enlarging or limiting an actor’s maneuverability in the region. Third point 
is the repercussion of predecessor that implies the tools which enable a country to get 
outcomes. Last but not least, for being a regional the recognition of actor’s role in 
responding region by internal and external actors are vital. Therefore, I will keep up 
with my thesis by considering all these together and unpacking all aforementioned 
approaches.   
2.1.4.Gradual Multilateralization and Regional Powers 
 
Since the beginning of 21st century, US hegemony on international stage has been 
revisited after several incidents 9/11 attacks, Afghanistan and Iraqi War, respectively. In 
economic terms, China’s economic miracle and constant high level economic growth as 
well as the rise of the BRICs and near-BRIC countries or emerging powers present 
serious challenge to existing international order. The debate concerning global power 
distribution and the future configuration of the global order has been going on.  
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In the last decade of 20th century, after the demise of Soviet Union, US which is the 
winner of Cold War appeared sole superpower in international politics. In economic, 
military, technological and cultural terms, US erectedas a giant that has strong ties with 
all around the world. Moreover, the values that advocated for decades against the Soviet 
expansionism appealed by myriad countries both in the European continent and other 
regions.  
The combination of material and ideational resources of US was interpreted by 
some scholars that unlike other hegemony in the past, the distinguishing feature of the 
US would become a belief that it would never decline.(Cox, 2001) It is, thus, put 
forward that the present system of international system is unipolar, peaceful most 
importantly durable.(Wohlforth, 1999) 
However, there were some counterarguments signifying the rise of the new powers 
by their influence in their changing regional and global role through their economic 
capacities. This reflected opposite claim of unilateralism and post-cold war era could 
suddenly turn into multilateral international system. In this context, after all of sudden 
disappearance of Soviet Union, newly emerging countries, such as Japan and Germany 
were indicated as the new super powers in international politics, and they would be able 
to constrain, to some extent, the maneuver field of US through their economic and 
technological presence. In addition, their increasing activity became the clear-cut proof 
of changing international structure.(Waltz, 1993) 
Despite emerging powers and changing international structure after even Cold-
War, there was a crucial reality that United States was the only super power in military 
terms with no need of any comparison through its leading role in the NATO and no 
intention of emerging countries on balancing US superiority in military field. 
Nevertheless, as indicated above, their sharply increasing role in economic and 
technological field, they would use the “soft balancing” (Layne, 2006; Pape, 2005; 
Paul,2005) so as to curb US unilateral action in all field. 
At this point, according to Samuel Huntington, none of the view on international 
system, neither unilateralism nor multilateralism, do not truly match with contemporary 
international politics. In Huntington’s view, there is solely superpower, United States, 
and several major powers and this system can be named as “uni-multipolar” 
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system.(Huntington, 2003)In this international system, the structure of global power 
distribution, according to Huntington, as follows:  
“At the top, the US has preeminence in every domain of power. At the 
second level are major regional powers, which are the dominant actors of in 
important areas of the world but whose interests and capabilities do not extend 
as globally as those of the US. At a third level are secondary regional powers 
whose influence in their region is less than that of the major regional powers. 
Finally, at the fourth level are all the remaining countries, some of which are 
quite important for various reasons but which do not play roles in the global 
power structure comparable to countries at the top three levels.”(Huntington, 
2003, 7-8) 
In Huntington’s definition, there is no distinct differentiation between regional and 
great powers place in his hierarchy. Normally, great powers with their influence on 
world diplomacy through their economic, military and political weight are taken place 
in second place, under superpower and upper of middle power, on power 
hierarchy.(Flemes, 2007) In this context, it can be thus said regional powers can be 
considered at same degree of great powers, from Huntington’s perspective. Contrary to 
this idea, regional powers are measured with the same degree of middle powers. 
Considering the fact that as well newly emerging middle powers focus more on their 
immediate region (Jordaan, 2003) is distinguishing feature from traditional middle 
power points out the another dimension of middle power in the frame of regional power. 
Because, in this frame, for new emerging middle power can be evaluated as regional 
power, as a consequence, as an opposite view to Huntington, regional power put the line 
of middle powers. The classification of regional power, is quite complicated that is 
derived from “the lack of analytical instruments to identify and to compare regional 
powers and to differentiate”(Nolte, 2010) whether they are middle or great power. Thus, 
it is safe to say that regional powers can be middle, great and even superpower in 
international politics.  
Considering the fact that distinguishing feature of great power is to possess nuclear 
weapons, with combination of to some extent material capacities, it would be claimed 
that a great power can be both regional and great power, however it is not in same 
possibilities to say that each regional powers are great power. With citing from the 
eminent working on the regional powers and their hierarchy, Barry Buzan and Ole 
Waever (2003) make clear distinction between super and great powers, whose influence 
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is felt globally, and regional power whose impact can be large in alleged region but less 
impact at the global level. 
In changing international political structure, it is enormously complicated to locate 
regional powers in global power structure. Nevertheless, there is increasingly clear 
reality that both regional and emerging powers are gaining importance and rising more 
rapidly than existing superpower, that is to say, convergence between regional or 
emerging powers and superpower or great powers is quite distinct. Accepting that there 
is an “unrevealing” with different “autonomous” centers in global politics(Haass, 2014), 
Buzan and Waever’s idea of regional powers are getting more influential in setting 
regional politics in this “unrevealing” and “autonomous” centers gain more currency.  
2.2. Contradictory Leaderships 
 
By recognizing Samuel Huntington’s assertion of a single hegemonic power in 
global politics and several regional powers, Andrew Hurrell(2007) questions the 
relationship between “one world and the many regions” in the globalization process 
with the leadership of sole hegemonic power and puts forward that “multiregional 
system of international relations” soars due to the reason that there is an re-attempt of 
regional institutionalization mushrooming in the different regions of world. Although 
Andrew Hurrell mainly emphasizes on the rapid regionalization movements with 
different dimension in the different regions of world, it is also a clear cut proof of 
external actors diminishing role and interference to respective regions in a time of 
“emerging regional architecture of world politics”.(Acharya, 2007) 
Looking at powers very distinct feature shows that most of them have regional 
characteristics together with this regional architecture of world politics. It is safe to say 
that regional powers have more autonomy in responding to these regions. This is also 
recognized as a “disorderly world” because of upholding a number of centers of gravity 
with “increasing autonomy.”(Haass, 2014) 
In this autonomous environment, in academic studies, there is no considerable 
working on how regional powers exercise and apply their resources so as to reach their 
regional ambitions.(Nolte, 2010) In this regard, Sandra Destradi focuses on three 
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strategies that regional powers could implement their foreign policy approaches in 
accordance with these strategies. Destradi (2010) points out three approaches of empire, 
hegemony and leadership with the help of IR theories main assumptions in order to fill 
the gap of explaining how regional powers design their interests to neighboring 
countries in responding regions. By a deeper glance, Destradi, at first, emphasizes on 
the coercive power for explaining the empire which a materially (military power) 
powerful country has the ability to threat on neighboring countries, if necessary and 
carry out military operation in guarantying its security. This approach also overlaps with 
John Mearsheimer’s Great Power Politics (Mearsheimer, 2001), who is admitted as 
preeminent offensive realist scholar, who envisages a power maximization of great 
powers to revise present status quo. He also hailed the instance of China as be coercive 
by declaring Monroe Doctrine that does not allow external power involvement to 
China’s possible action to reshape its respective region.(Mearsheimer, 2014) 
Second, Destradi focuses on another strategy that entails both a value based order 
provided by preeminent state and consent by other actors in international politics which 
is called as hegemony. Recognizing final goal of hegemonic state that is establishment 
of  stable environment, Destradi takes closer look at the strategies that a hegemonic 
state might adopt in reaching its final goals and those strategies are called “hard”, 
“intermediate” or “soft”. Destradi’s underscore of hegemonic role of regional powers 
reminds us why we should not rule out the hegemonic stability theory that basically 
explains how a global order would be stable and secure. The theory mainly suggests that 
an existence of hegemonic actor which is capable of power components remaining its 
preeminence and volunteer to carry burden has to pave the way to build up institution, 
rules and norms in line with its interests.(Kindleberger, 1986) And thus, a global 
stability can be enjoyed by other actors in the system that considers the costs and 
benefits in established order. Degrading this approach to the regional context, it is 
assumed that a regionally hegemonic power would be conducive to shaping regional 
institutions, norms and rules for the sake of both its interests and regional stability that 
is good for all stakeholders. However, here is a crucial question soaring and it is what if 
no existential hegemonic actor surfaces in the region?  
Thirdly, Destradi analyzes leadership as a strategy for regional powers. Rather 
empire, it is assumed that leadership strategy does not cover coercive application, yet it 
requires a leader country that has to have considerable influence that leads to gain 
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followers in her policies. Destradi splits leadership attempts into two groups: “leader 
initiated” and “follower initiated” leadership.(Destradi, 2010) In her view, leader 
initiated leadership is a socialization process which is cemented on shared norms and 
values and here is most important point and that is collectivity. In the latter approach, 
the follower initiated approach could stem from a necessity, like strengthening ties 
against a common threat, whose process is prone to be bottom-up oriented. After all 
these, here another question again arises what if there are more than one actor playing 
leadership role and whose foreign policy projection is totally different comparing to 
other one?   
These aforementioned strategies are important when it comes to the topic of 
regional powers that seem discomforted regarding the present structure of international 
organizations including the UN Security Council. When we look at the countries 
directing harsh criticism on the present structure of the UN Security Council, it is not 
surprising to come across countries of Brazil, South Africa, India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia 
who are all regarded as regional powers, as well. In this context, thinking about regional 
powers’ discontent together with Destradi’s applied strategies for regional powers, it is 
easily interpreted that these countries could implement those strategies so as to enhance 
their status in global politics. This might result in the configuration of permanent 
membership of UN Security Council.   
The most concrete evidence how regional powers hold better status is US itself 
after the process of it had declared Monroe Doctrine, which excluded external power’s 
involvement to the regional issues, and gradually imposed its regional strategies, at first, 
and global politics, second. By benefitting from a Waltz’s approach, the regional power 
could also gather in an institutional cooperation with the leadership of pro-eminent 
country that would derive from either leader itself or bottom-up level for balancing a 
rising regional actor. Gulf Cooperation Council’s emergence is clear cut proof of this 
institutionalization around common shared norms and most importantly threats coming 
out from Iran. In context of regional integration, cooperative hegemony, which implies 
active role of major states in regional institutionalization(Pedersen, 2002) is also a 
theorized version of how regional powers play crucial role in regional 
institutionalization by sharing their power. These all imply a regional 
institutionalization around materially and ideationally powerful states, which eventually 
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and vulnerably causes no clash with this power states intra-regional countries in both 
sub-regional and regional environment. 
So far, researchers on regional powers generally have been evolved around the 
context of regional integration, regional cooperation, global politics, multi-polarization, 
regional/international order, values, identity so on and so forth. This situation put 
researchers under illusion that as if there is no another regional power in the responding 
region of a regional power whose intended strategies and projections for the region 
would be in a conflict with other actor. That is to say, remembering leadership in the 
conceptualization of regional powers, no intensive focus on the possible intra-regional 
conflict, due to the assertiveness of a regional actors and its confrontation with another 
one that also aspires regional strategy, has been done. In this context, Daniel 
Flames(2009) sought to explain how South Africa’s historical legacy caused regional 
rejection for South Africa’s cooperative hegemony strategy in its region. Yet, there is no 
considerable attention on multiple regional powers’ comparative foreign policy analysis 
in the context of their regional strategy to upholding regional developments. It is also 
the fact that “countries in the regions themselves could form counter-alliance against the 
emerging regional power.”(Nolte, 2010) or a regional power could mobilizes its 
resources in order to curb active regional power’s actions.    
Regional powers’ emergence in different parts of world does also mean that 
different intra-regional challenger or follower would exist in these respective regions. 
Assuming that Brazil and South Africa’s intraregional challengers arethe same as India 
and Turkey’s intraregional challengers in the regions of South Asia and Middle East, all 
of which are ideationally and materially powerful states with different regional 
projections and foreign policy approaches, is inaccurate. In the latter point, it would 
eventually lead to the “contradictory leaderships” which means a regional actor, whose 
regional projection does not overlap with another regional power that aspires regional 
order in accordance with its or together with its allies interest, could mobilize its own 
power resources in order to narrow down the maneuver field of this just aforementioned 
ambitious actor.  
This contradictory leadership would be prolonged or short lived. It is dependent on 
the number of actors and their ability to find out a middle ground in their interests. In 
this context, if there are two different policy oriented countries in a region, as long as no 
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middle way is found, there would be a prolonged clash of regional powers when a 
regionally effective wave hits the region and sides with the opposite side of the coin. 
However, if there are more than two actors in the region, it would lead to involuntarily 
less lived flexible alliance among the regional actors in order to create a balance of 
power for reducing the influence of soaring regional powers.     
2.3. Background  
 
As mentioned above, structural differences of foreign policy projections between at 
least two actors are fundamental point for the contradictory leaderships of regional 
powers. Bouzazi’s self-immolation not only sparked the revolutionary waves in Tunisia 
but also it incepted a sharp shifting in regional geo-politics. Pre-eminent regional actors 
have calibrated their foreign policy instruments complying with their interests in 
accordance with their expectations in this trans-boundary revolutionary wave. In this 
thesis, there are mainly two reasons why I have deliberately chosen Turkey and Saudi 
Arabia in order to reach out robust outcomes; first, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are both 
strong and loyal allies of the United States of America whose influence considerably 
declined in the region, second both are Sunni majority country. Especially in the second 
reason, there were harsh criticism targeting Turkey on the issue that during the Arab 
Spring Turkey has pursued Sunni oriented foreign policy approach instead of 
democracy and human rights oriented approach. Hence, by comparing Saudi Arabia and 
Turkey’s foreign policy approach toward the Arab Spring, there will be healthy 
interpretations on how these allegations are reliable.  
Beyond these, Turkey’s relatively “new” foreign policy approach, namely “pro-
active” foreign policy, and Saudi Arabia’s traditional foreign policy approach which is 
based on “defensive” characters that is set up in order to maintain regime’s existence 
appealed me to make a comparative analysis on the Arab Spring. Last but not the least, 
Turkey’s idealistic viewpoint on the Arab Spring is in direct conflict with Saudi 
Arabia’s realist and pragmatist foreign policy orientation.  
The unexpected Arab Spring has fundamentally shaken regional politics and 
brought very ambitious and resistant demands of democracy and human rights 
prioritized governance, which was never an accustomed movement in the Middle East. 
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In this unprecedented environment, regional powers calibrated their regional policies 
and projections in accordance with unfolding developments. This was actually a greater 
chance and challenge for regional powers in examining their capabilities in favor of 
developments. 
Since the inception of the Arab Spring, there have been two fronts aspiring to quite 
opposite regional power role in dealing with this revolutionary wave. Theoretical 
discussion for regional powers’ aspiring role in their respective regions mainly 
emphasizes three different strategies of empire, hegemony and leaderships (Destradi, 
2010). Assuming neither Saudi Arabia nor Turkey are sufficient to embrace hegemonic 
or empire role in the region, their leadership role stemming from their ideational and 
material resources will be taken into account in this thesis.  
As Sandra Destradi suggested, a regional power can assert a regional leadership 
role. However, this leadership role might confront with another regional power that has 
a different perspective for the region. This unintentionally emerges a regional 
competition among regional powers which curbs and limits regional powers 
maneuverability inside the region itself. In order to make this more understandable, an 
empirical analysis dealing with regional powers and their intra-regional environment 
together with possible constraints will be enriched with drawing on theoretical 
discussions.  
In this context, comparing Saudi Arabia and Turkey’s attitude toward the Arab 
Spring in a time of regional powers gaining a greater chance to shape order is a unique 
and novel opportunity in aforementioned enrichment. The democratic demands, 
resurgence of political Islamist movement and their ascendance to power caused Saudi 
Arabia and Turkey to take contradictory leaderships in the region.  
With the withdrawal of the US, the region became gradually autonomous and more 
prone to the influence of regional powers. Turkey politically and economically propped 
up revolutionary waves spreading from Tunisia to Syria during the Arab Spring because 
it was assumed that regimes consolidated with democratic legitimacy would be 
conducive in overcoming entrenched governing problems in the Middle East. By 
assuming this, Turkey thought it would enlarge its penetration through cooperation with 
these governments that were ideologically familiar or seeking a similar path to the 
ruling Justice and Development Party in Turkey.  
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On the contrary, Saudi Arabia pursued more pragmatic approaches of shifting its 
attitude ranging from being a revolutionary in Libya and Syria but counterrevolutionary 
in Bahrain and Egypt due to its lack of legitimacy and prolonged sectarian rivalry with 
Iran. This signified a contradictory leadership between Saudi Arabia and Turkey in 
curbing its regional projections of advocating a more democratic realm in the Middle 
East.  
These two structural differences between Turkey and Saudi Arabia during the Arab 
Spring inevitably breed competition, democracy, and human rights promotion with the 
leadership of Turkey on the one hand, curbing a revolutionary wave and maneuvering 
pragmatically with the leadership of Saudi Arabia on the other. Bahrain, Egypt, and 
Syria, the main case studies for my thesis are the principal places in which contradictory 
leaderships with fluctuating levels between these two actors occurred. In a nutshell, the 
intra-regional competition of these regional powers’ leaderships over Bahrain, Egypt, 
and Syria during the Arab Spring will be deeply analyzed. 
After all, I will comparatively analyze Turkish and Saudi Arabia’s view on the 
Arab Spring and seek out to put this empirical analysis in the frame of the concept of 
“clash of regional powers”. In order to cement my idea, my thesis will continue as 
follows: first, I will analyze Turkey’s regional power resources and its pro-active 
foreign policy orientations together with its main pillars, second Saudi Arabia’s foreign 
policy approach together with its regional power resources will be appeared by drawing 
on Saudi’s foreign policy structure together with how it pondered on regionally 
effective revolutionary wave at past experiences. Consequently, I will analyze how they 
approached the Arab Spring by deliberately focusing on three countries of Syria, Egypt 
and Bahrain. The reason behind selecting these countries is that there is a clear 
divergence of Turkey and Saudi Arabia on the developments of Egypt. For Syria, it 
seems there is an overlapping goal between Turkey and Saudi Arabia but the 
fragmentations that both actors prop up in this country was very different, hence there 
will be in depth analysis so as to prove structural differences in both countries approach. 
Bahrain will be clear cut proof of showing how regional powers have their own 
influence within their respective sub-region.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
TURKEY AS PRO-ACTIVE REGIONAL POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
3.1. Main Determinants of Traditional Turkish ForeignPolicy 
 
It is generally accepted that a country’s internal dynamics play a vital role in 
shaping the country’s foreign policy. Immediately after the establishment of newly 
independent country of the Republic of Turkey, several reforms in the field of 
administration, education, justice were intensively conducted by the founding father of 
the Republic of Turkey. However, the main determinants of traditional Turkish Foreign 
Policy can even be traced back to Ottoman Era, particularly after the period when 
Ottoman Empire began to decline. 
There are two principles that explain the traditional Turkish Foreign Policy; 
Westernization and Status Quo.(Oran, 2001, 46-50)  These principles can be explained 
by taking into consideration the domestic dynamics of Turkey together with changing 
international political conjuncture. In this context, according to Aydin, defining these 
principles change from state to state, however two main variables “conjectural and 
structural factors”(Aydın, 1999) shape the Turkish foreign policy.  
The historical experience of Ottoman Empire and the security concern of the 
founder elites of Republic of Turkey indicate one of the main structural variables in 
building status quo based foreign policy approach. In this context, appearance of 
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Ottoman Empire as a secondary power in European politics after 18th century underwent 
it to adopt the policies aiming to balance the power between major challengers. Thus, it 
was believed Ottoman Empire could either prevent the loss of territory through its 
flexible alliances or at least minimize it. Hence, Ottoman Empire’s security culture, 
which was offensive for enlarging its power by capturing new territories and 
incorporating new population, evolved to “defensive realpolitik”.(Karaosmanoğlu, 
2000) However, it cannot be said that this defensive realpolitik derived from domestic 
developments, which became effective after Republican era in shaping foreign policy.  
After the prolonged First World War and the Independence War of Turkey, newly 
independent state was occupied to implement intensive domestic reforms thereby 
foreign policy was not priority as long as there was no direct threats to territorial 
integrity of Turkey. This status quo based foreign policy approach demonstrates a well 
thought out approach of policy makers in regards to Turkey’s power as well as very 
rational preference taken by foreign policy makers. This policy became crystal clear 
with Atatürk’s phrase “Peace at home, peace at world” which indicates both the peace 
oriented international line and realistic side of foreign policy that avoided getting 
conflict with imperial powers in a time when colonization reached its 
zenith.(Davutoğlu, 2011, 69) In this context, it is great example that despite the fact that 
Mosul was accepted within the border of National Pact, before the establishment of 
Turkey, not turning incompatibility into armed conflict with British, that was the 
protector of Iraq, over Mosul problem is a clear cut proof of recognition of Turkey’s 
power limitation.(Hale, 2002, 72) 
The military success of western countries against the Ottoman Empire during the 
17th and 18th centuries had alerted Ottoman Empire to alter unwieldy state structure. 
Initial reforms were carried out in military field so as to curb loosing on battle ground 
and then were replicated in the field of administration.  
After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, founding elites prioritized 
domestic reforms that were derived from western values because modernization had 
been solely brought collaterally with westernization process in their viewpoint. Hence, 
western based values should have been immediately implemented in every aspect of 
social, political and cultural life in order to modernize the newly independent 
country.(Bozdağlıoğlu, 2008)The westernization process was embarked on shortly after 
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the bitter experience of the Ottoman Empire with Arabic countries in the Middle East. 
In addition to this, it was also the fact Turkish territories in Central Asia and Caucasus 
were occupied by Russia and under the control of it. Preventing territorial losses in 
these regions, ideologically, two approaches, Pan-Islamist and Pan Turkist, had already 
been tried by Ottoman elites but ultimately failed. Last but not the least, Turkey had no 
enough power to shift present situation in both geography.  
Keeping in view this brief historical background, traditional Turkish Foreign Policy 
can be described by two terms “Westernization” and “Status Quo”. According to 
Murinson, there are four main sources of this traditional Turkish foreign policy as 
aforementioned: “the historical experience of the Ottoman Empire”, “the nationalist 
Kemalist revolution and creation of republic itself”, western orientation expressed in the 
policy of Europeanization and modernization” and the suspicion of foreign powers and 
interests.”(Murinson, 2006) 
3.2. The Basis of New Turkish Foreign Policy 
 
New Turkish Foreign Policy was heavily used in the Justice and Development 
Party era however cleavages from the traditional Turkish Foreign Policy can be very 
distinctively seen in Turgut Özal era, who was Prime Minister between 1983 and 1989 
and President of the Republic of Turkey between 1989 and 1991. Considering the fact 
that Motherland party adopted values such as being conservative and embraced the 
national moral values and enforcement of free market and free enterprise, Motherland 
Party is considered as “precursor of the Justice and Development Party”(Murinson, 
2006) due to similar implementations both in domestic politics and foreign policy 
approach.  
According to Laçiner, the Özal era can be evaluated by separating two periods; 
during the first period 1983 and 1989, the agenda of Özal was occupied by domestic 
reforms and coping with the challenge between coup leaders and civilian politicians, 
economic and political stability. During the second period, Özal created maneuver field 
and paid more attention on the democratization and foreign policy.(Laçiner, 2009) 
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With the allowance of democratic election by military government in 1983, Özal 
came into power with overwhelming number of votes that allowed him to form a 
government with no support from other parties. Initially, Özal’s neoliberal economic 
policies were coupled with domestic reforms, expanding individual rights and 
incorporating Kurds, Alawites into the political process. Subsequently, due to the 
loneliness of Turkey in international stage, Özal undertook crucial initiatives so as to 
restore deteriorated relations with the EEC, US and other regional actors around 
Turkey.  
Özal initially intended to fix relations with necessary alliance of US.  Since 
humiliated Johnson Letter that warned Turkey not to intervene the Cyprus Issue, 
American and Turkish relations became unreliable in the eyes of Turkish policy makers. 
However, the corruption of relations between Turkey and US reached its peak with 
imposed embargos by US to Turkey due to the military intervention of Turkey to 
Cyprus for keeping the rights of Turkish Cypriots in 1974. A year prior to the military 
coup of 1980, international politics had witnessed two crucial things that shaped the US 
point of view against military junta in Turkey in 1980. Firstly, the military occupation 
of Afghanistan by Soviet Union took place which could embark on a domino effect on 
the “Green” containment policy of US toward the Soviet Union. Secondly, the Iranian 
Revolution was followed which turned Iran from one of the most reliable alliance into a 
hostile country. Both developments in international politics made US concerned about 
the future of Turkey.  
When Özal came into power, Turkish – American relations were relatively well 
established through aforementioned reasons. However the main pillars of the relations 
were still based on security dimension. This drastically changed in the Özal Era, 
demonstrating Turkey’s keenness to expand relations in the field of economy, trade and 
social development which broadened dimensions of relations and this approach of 
Turkish foreign policy makers were not generally witnessed by American politicians till 
Özal Era.(Ataman, 2003)Hence, export and import values considerably increased. The 
Turkish defense industry cooperated with the US in the F-16 project. Consequently, 
although some crisis such as decreasing American aid to Turkey due to the pressure by 
Greek lobbies and alleged “Armenian Genocide” bills in US congress during the Özal 
Era, the deteriorated relations between Turkey and US took a positive turn of dimension 
and strategic concept.  
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During the first phase of the Özal Era, thankfully to military coup and its painful 
undemocratic implications, Turkey was harshly slammed and isolated by the European 
countries. Moreover, Greece, which was at par with Turkey in the context of European 
politics, was no longer outside of the European Community rather it became part of 
decision making process. To repair the relations between Turkey and the EEC, EEC 
expected Turkey to demonstrate its readiness for putting relations on a stable route.  
In this context, with relying on liberalization in economy and fostering export-
oriented trade that abolished many trade restrictions with several countries as well as 
enhancing the individual rights and reducing army’s role on politics, in 1987, Özal 
evaluated Turkey was ready to become a part of EEC and applied for full-membership 
despite an unofficial warning by EU officials that the rejection of application was highly 
possible. Özal’s remarks on application “according to agreements, there is no way, they 
can postpone it, but not refused” was clear cut proof of the continuity of the EEC aimed 
reforms and the EEC’s prioritization in Turkish foreign policy.  
During Özal’s second era, Özal focused more on the foreign policy issues and 
democratization in low politics. Thankfully his quest in his first era for the 
comprehensive inclusion of different social groups into political process that impacted 
the diversification of different view in making foreign policy, as its consequence, Özal’s 
government became more sensitive on the regions in which Turkey has historical and 
cultural ties. 
Particularly, with the demise of Soviet Union, major changes in international 
politics marked an opening of new era in Turkish foreign policy. Even though it was 
supposed that Turkey’s value in the western alliance and strategic importance 
depreciated after the disappearance of Soviet Union, new opportunities for Turkey from 
Central Asia to Balkans, from Balkans to Greater Middle East occurred.ThroughÖzal’s 
export-oriented economy policy and its result that the emergence of trade groups, 
particularly in the field of middle size manufacturing, became propellant power at the 
behind of improving economic relations with the Middle Eastern countries, even though 
some disputed bilateral issues erupted like over Euphrates and the Tigris rivers with 
Syria and Iraq. In addition, in Özal’s eyes, Arab countries and neighboring countries 
were considered as natural market for Turkey and even its allies.(Ataman, 2002) 
Turkey’s relation with these countries was required for Turkey, at least as much as its 
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compulsory relations with western countries for modernizing and updating Turkey’s 
status in globalizing world, so that Turkey can distinctively play its role as a bridge 
between Asia and Europe.  
For Özal, it can be said that he was the first to lay foundation of a “multi-
dimensional” foreign policy. He not only dealt with the Arab countries, the EEC, US 
and neighboring countries, but also played a pivotal role in recognizing the Turkish 
republics. Turkey as a country which embraced secular and democratic political 
structure as well as a free market economy presented a model, namely “Turkish Model”, 
to Turkic republics.(Aras, 2008) Cultural, social, educational programs were launched 
by Turkey and Central Asian countries in order to enhance the relations with these 
countries. The inclusion of myriad social groups into political process, made them also 
pressure groups over government through their direct link with associations etc. All of 
these factors combined enabled Turkey to play a more influential role in the 
Balkans.(Oran, 2002, 170) 
With Özal, Turkish foreign policy gradually became more engaged with regional 
issues in which it had historical and cultural ties that caused reinvestigation of Turkey’s 
traditional foreign policy approach. Especially, the first Gulf War proved Turkey’s 
departure from “traditional policy of non-involvement in regional conflicts” by standing 
with the US against Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait.(Sayarı, 2003) Moreover, Laçiner’s 
(2009) claim “after the Gulf War Özal claimed that Turkey was the protector of the 
Iraqi Kurds and Turkmens in its capacity as the big brother of these people, arguing that 
a federation between these people was possible under Turkish sponsorship”supported 
this idea. 
In a nutshell, the articulation of Özal’s foreign policy was substantially helped by 
both domestic and international developments.(Aras & Görener, 2010) Following Özal 
Era, the weakness of coalition governments and their struggle in domestic politics has 
led to overlooking of the foreign policy. Despite Erbakan’s strong critics to western 
based international system and his tendency to Islamist countries, there was no clear 
departure from Turkey’s traditional western oriented foreign policy approach due to 
military’s weight on domestic politics and lack of public support in putting Turkey’s 
route towards Islamic countries. Erbakan’s policy actually was nothing more replacing 
Turkey’s western oriented policy with Islamist oriented policy, not reflecting multi-
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dimensional new Turkish Foreign Policy.  The change in the mindset of bureaucratic 
elites has occurred with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 1997-2002, Ismail Cem. With 
giving special reference to Turkey’s geographical location and historical 
enrichments(Cem, 2005, 10-20), Cem enforced to improve relations with regional 
countries around Turkey, but it was left at limited level.   
3.3. New Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkey’s Emergence as Regional Power 
in the Middle East 
 
Distinct activism in Turkish Foreign Policy, particularly since 2002, has been quite 
visible along with the occupation of harshly implemented positive reforms in domestic 
politics. Through reforms in the field of economic and domestic politics as well as 
previously politically omitted groups inclusion in shaping foreign policy, Turkish 
foreign policy gained a new dimension and policy makers enlarged their horizon. In the 
economic field, Turkey caught uninterrupted economic growth after deeply influential 
crisis through making functional independent economic institutions etc. 
Appointment of Ahmet Davutoğlu as an adviser of Prime Minister in charge of 
foreign affairs was demonstration of adoption of the new foreign policy vision. The 
theoretical perspectives of this vision can be found in Ahmet Davutoğlu’s well-known 
book, “strategic depth”, in which he criticizes Turkey’s passive role in international 
politics and comes up with new ideas for Turkey’s role in international politics. In this 
elaborated approach, Davutoğlu denied the defined role of Turkey as a “bridge” 
country, between Asia and Europe, replacing this passive role with Turkey’s role as a 
“central” country.(Davutoğlu, 2011, 116; Davutoğlu, 2004)Davutoğlu believes that 
Turkey’s strategic depth lies behind its own “historical legacy” and “geographical 
location”(Davutoğlu, 2011, 65) that provides great opportunities for Turkey to enlarge 
its horizon in different areas. As Aras argues:  
“The new foreign policy took form under the impact of Davutoğlu’s 
redefinition of Turkey’s role in the neighboring regions and in international 
politics, namely its “strategic depth”, with frontiers that have expanded 
beyond the homeland in the cognitive map of policymaker’s minds. The 
new territorial limits to Turkish involvement in neighboring countries has 
disappeared in this new mindset”(Aras, 2009) 
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Giving meaning to Turkey’s redefined role, Turkish foreign policy was based on 
various principles as it is lined up: rhythmic diplomacy, multi-dimensional foreign 
policy, zero problems with neighbors, order instituting actor, international cooperation 
and proactive foreign policy.(Davutoğlu, 2012) 
Implementation of this new vision began with deepening relations between the EU 
and Turkey. When AK Party, that has its Islamist roots, took over the government, 
bureaucratic and military elites in Turkey, who became the propellant power at the 
behind of implemented domestic and external policies, had several hesitations for the 
future of secular structure and republican principles of Turkey. Reducing military’s 
influence on politics, AK Party benefited from EU’s transformative effect, thusit was 
such an obligatory for abolishing the bias on AK Party. 
In the beginning of AK Party era, two important steps were taken that gained 
positive tendency in acceleration of the deepening relations between Turkey and the 
EU. First, the Cyprus Problem, which had restrained Turkish foreign policy for several 
years and is a crucial point in Turkish- EU Relations, has been taken seriously into 
consideration. Eventually, the UN with the support of international community, 
especially the EU, has elaborately prepared a solution plan which was submitted to both 
communities in Cyprus Problem. For the first time in Cyprus Problem, the AK Party 
rejected the main idea of “the lack of solution is solution in Cyprus Issue” and fostered 
the UN plan. However, Annan Referenda was rejected at substantial rate by Greek 
Cypriot, as overwhelming Turkish Cypriot said “yes” for solution in the island. This 
result clearly demonstrated that Turkey and Turkish Cypriots were not promoting 
deadlock. Secondly, on 17th December 2004, EU agreed to embark on negotiations with 
Turkey. Therefore, the legitimacy of conducted reforms has arise the hope and support 
for the EU process. These earlier years of the AK Party and gained impetus to relation 
between Turkey and the EU were defined as “golden age of Europeanization in 
Turkey”(Öniş, 2008) by leading scholar ZiyaÖniş. 
The EU’s transformative effect on domestic politics of Turkey in terms of 
democratization coupled with economic success through reforms following period of 
economic crisis in 2001. After deeply influential economic crisis in 2001, economic 
reforms that were prepared by Kemal Derviş were continued under the AK Party 
government. Moreover, the structural reforms, in economic institutions and related areas 
 26 
 
such as privatization in several fields, establishing independent central bank were 
implemented in accordance with IMF’s stand-by agreement. Thus, Turkey’s long 
lasting structural problem inflation was taken under control while ensuring an 
uninterrupted economic growth. Hence, the economic development and the increasing 
role of entrepreneurial groups made them “pressure groups” and made economy 
possible to play very active role in foreign policy.(Kutlay, 2011)As Turkish economy 
boomed and export volume increased day by day, Turkish economy was defined as 
“practical hand”(Kutlay, 2011) of new Turkish foreign policy and Turkish businessmen 
were named as “diplomats”.(Atlı, 2011) 
As Turkish economy became more globalized, the more decision makers of 
Turkish foreign policy prioritized trade and investment opportunities. In this context, 
Kemal Kirişçi used the term “trading state” as one of the definitive elements in 
changing traditional Turkish foreign policy. Kirişçi says: 
“the rise of the trading state has transformed and is transforming 
traditional foreign makers, too. They are increasingly coming to recognize 
that Turkey’s national interest cannot be solely determined in terms of 
narrowly defined national security, and that economic considerations such 
as to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct 
investment are just as important.”(Kirişçi, 2009) 
The new motto of Turkish Foreign Policy “Zero Problem with Neighbors” has not 
only opened the door for Turkey to strengthen its ties with neighboring countries at state 
level but also paved the way for trade liberalization and for abolishing the visa 
restrictions in front of the Turkish trader. This influence of economy in shaping foreign 
policy cannot be taught with overlooking the reconceptualization of national security, as 
well. Particularly, Turkey’s changing security understanding to certain neighboring 
countries such as Iran and Syria,(Aras & Polat, 2008; Altunışık & Tür, 2006)  
subsequently, even to Iraqi Kurdistan caused increasing in Turkey’s trade volume and 
constitution of multi-layered dimension in Turkish foreign policy. 
Like in the Özal Era, AK Party’s agenda was mostly occupied for democratizing 
political structure and fixing destroyed economy, but basis of new foreign policy was 
cemented in this period. With the electoral triumph of the AK Party in 2007, increasing 
its vote from %34 in 2002 to %47 in 2007, AK Party gained more legitimacy and 
gradually moved to deal more intensively with foreign policy issues. 
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Political stability and economic growth in the area of low politics have acted as 
catalysts for a more assertive foreign policy. In particular, since 2002, Turkey, 
previously internalized the western identity for itself for a long time, now has realized 
its Eastern part, following these, an expansion in Middle East and Africa has given 
opportunity to reemerge in the areas or it provided new spaces for Turkey. In addition, 
along with the Soviet collapse, the relations with newly emerging Central Asian Turkic 
Republics, which were firstly launched in Özal Era, have caught momentum in 
economic, political and cultural spheres. 
3.4. Turkey’s Foreign Policy towards the Middle East and Regional Power 
Dimension 
 
As indicated above; the changing security understanding of Turkey, new emerging 
interest groups and most importantly new vision in Turkish foreign policy provided 
Turkey to reemerge influentially in the Middle East. Despite the fact that changes in 
domestic environment and economic development became propellant power behind of 
Turkey’s headway towards the Middle East, stagnated relations with western countries, 
particularly with EU members, due to their insincere attitudes toward Turkey also 
became effective in shaping Turkey’s regional engagement with the Middle East. 
The positive acceleration of Turkey’s relation with European Union at the earlier 
period of the AK Party had tended to decrease after leaders in Europe who were totally 
against the Turkey’s accession to the EU came into power, particularly in France and 
Germany. Also, Turkey’s denial to implement custom union to Southern Administration 
of the Republic of Cyprus which was admitted as full member in the EU in May 2004 
even although its rejection to Annan Referenda that was a chance to over problem with 
Southern Administration and Turkey. The increased hope in the public opinion with 
regard to Turkey’s accession to EU was suddenly replaced by pessimistic view in 
Turkey. Moreover, the EU was continually blamed to become double-faced in its 
attitudes against Turkey by high-level Turkish politicians. Turkey’s relations with the 
other side of Atlantic were not also going on its proper route. Additionally to shocked 
Turkish non-permission to US to use Turkey’s airspace for conducting military 
operation against Iraq in 2003, the different perspectives of Turkey and US on regional 
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issues like Iranian Nuclear Issue, Syria and HAMAS’s victory along with its 
repercussions in both capitals made more clear that Ankara and Washington had 
different regional agenda so that Turkey had wanted to become more independent in its 
near periphery.  
Turkey’s distinct activism in the Middle East also coincided with the time when 
Middle Eastern stakeholders had different view from each other and when there was a 
power struggle going on in the region.(Turan, 2010) In regional power context, Kardaş 
points out crucial dimension why Turkey to play active role in the Middle East as 
follows: 
“The EU’s absorption of southeastern Europe and the stabilization of the 
region diminished Turkey’s relevance as a regional power in the Balkans. 
Turkey still exercises some influence over developments concerning Bosnia 
and other smaller Balkan countries; yet in this region it has already reached 
its limits. Similarly, it is difficult to talk about proactive Turkish presence 
east of Caspian Sea, due largely to Russia’s regaining its influence in 
Central Asia and Turkey’s limited access to region. These transformations 
leave only the Middle East for Turkey to play an active strategic 
role.”(Kardaş, 2010) 
Turkey’s political, economic and socio cultural involvement in the Middle East has 
sparked the discussion regarding Turkish Foreign Policy’s “Middle 
Easternization”(Oğuzlu, 2008) or the “axis shift” in Turkish Foreign Policy. It was clear 
that Turkish foreign policy was never activated till AK Party era since the establishment 
of republic. However, it was a part of its embraced foreign policy approaches, namely 
multi-dimensional and proactive foreign policy. Şahin(2010) considers that latest 
opening in Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East is not the “axis shift” rather it is 
reconsideration of being a loyal part of the western alliance without any investigation. 
Öniş(2011) also emphasized the exaggeration of the used term “Middle Easternization 
of Turkish Foreign Policy” and observed latest development in Turkish foreign policy is 
within the context of multi-dimensional foreign policy. 
The timing of the intensification of discussion regarding Middle Easternization of 
Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkey’s increasing role as well as a regional power 
discourse was not a coincidence. Timely, it was coincided the discussions regarding US 
role on global level were intensified due to China’s uninterrupted rapidly economic and 
political growing together with other emerging powers, in particular of economic fields, 
such as India, Brazil, Russia and South Africa. These considerations were coupled with 
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the US role in the Middle East, especially since Obama administration, and 
reprioritization of the US policy towards the Eastern Asia which caused no influentially 
existence of super power in the Middle East. Hence, Turkey’s quest for “strategic 
autonomy”(Kardaş, 2011) made it more sensitive in regional issues.  
In addition to Turkey’s increasing political influence on the Middle East, booming 
Turkish economy laid the foundations for more assertive foreign policy and Ankara 
emerged as an influential regional power.(Öniş & Kutlay, 2013) 
3.4.1. Turkey’s Economic Power 
 
Aftermath of the ruinous economic crisis of 2001, Turkey harshly implemented 
economic reforms by controlling financial system, which was the main reason of 2001 
crisis, building new-independent institutions, moreover political stability with Justice 
and Development Party accelerated Turkey’s economic growth since 2001. As 
aforementioned, Turkey’s pro-active foreign policy with its main component under the 
motto of zero-problem with neighbors coupled with Turkey’s economic growth and 
enabled Turkish trader to strengthen their economic activities by investing their money 
or exporting their goods to the Middle East. Hence, it was not only ended up with that 
the proportional sharing of export goods to the EU countries was tended to decline on 
the one hand, Turkey’s total volume in terms of export considerably arose on the other, 
but also in Turkey middle class manufacturing sectors were prone to gear up its 
productivity which provided to decrease unemployment in domestic environment.   
Comparing Turkey’s economic indicators from the year of 2002 to the eve of Arab 
Spring’s fueling of 2010; Turkey’s GDP exceeded 3 times by reaching 731 billion US 
dollar, per capita more or less became 10.000 US dollar, with the exception of 2009 that 
was following year of world economic crisis Turkish average economic growth surfaced 
as 5.2 per annum.  Most importantly, with the logic of “trading state” approach which 
became the main pillar of Turkish foreign policy, Turkish export reached 113.9 billion 
US dollar, capturing considerable market sharing in the Middle East, and appeared 
approximately 4 times higher comparing with 2002.  
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Prior to the eruption of the Arab Spring, Turkey erected as the biggest economy in 
the Middle East region, surpassing oil rich Saudi Arabia and oil rich but isolated Iran, 
which caught attention of Arab society, as well on Turkey and enormously well 
contributed Turkey’s  perception in the region. According to report that was prepared by 
TESEV in order to measure Turkey’s perception in the Middle East in 2010, Turkey 
was responded as it will be the biggest economy in the region 10 years later and Turkish 
economy took place at the second line by %12 as a response of the question Turkey 
should be model for the region.(Akgün & Perçinoğlu, 2010)  As it is seen in the TESEV 
report, Turkey’s economic booming became influential in the mindset of the Arab 
people as well as Turkey’s economic booming and steady growing were enough for 
Turkey to meet the requirement of being regional power.  
3.4.2. Turkey’s Diplomatic Power 
 
Until a decade earlier of the eruption of the Arab Spring, Turkish foreign policy 
was roughly moved on westward and paid no considerable attention by keeping its 
direct involvement into the Middle Eastern crisis as long as circumstances were not 
about directly related with Turkey’s national security. For this reason, Turkish 
diplomatic activities were generally embedded into the western oriented bilateral and 
organizational ties, taking place in institutions such as Council of Europe and NATO. 
Unsurprisingly, Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ staff had been employed by preferring 
dominantly English and French speaking people. However, after all of sudden the 
Turkey’s embracement of pro-active foreign policy approach and active involvement 
the regional issues, Turkey has embarked on diplomatic opening from Latin America 
region to the Africa and propped its representatives up at abroad by appointing 
diplomatic staff who can speak native language of where they go. Nevertheless, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ staff and Turkey’s engagements with the Middle East in 
terms of both bilateral capacity and institutionalized bodies were not enough for 
Turkey’s regional power role, as numbers will be indicated below. 
First of all, Turkey is a proceeding country for full membership in the EU and 
admitted as a founding member of the Council of Europe. These are the political 
organizations that Turkey takes place but there is also military organization that Turkey 
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is the second biggest army inside of it that is NATO. The sole remarkable organization 
that enables Turkey to gather with Arabic countries is the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation. In this context, Turkey did its utmost effort so as to provide Ekmeleddin 
İhsanoğlu to be elected for General Secretary of OIC in 2004 and accomplished it. 
However, in organizational bases, there was no more meaning than being symbolic. In 
addition, Turkey was unable to prompt any organization in the Middle East with 
omitting the global scale organizations. 
For this reason, Turkey’s bilateral relations with regional countries gain currency 
and should be evaluated by taking Minister of Foreign Affairs’ diplomatic ability into 
consideration. Propping up Turkey’s diplomatic capacity also availed the diplomatic 
missions in the Middle East however in the eve of Arab Spring, Turkey’s diplomatic 
capacity was not satisfied for being “order setter” country in the region.(Kutlay & 
Dinçer, 2012, 18) According to USAK report, the number of Turkey’s diplomatic 
mission in Arabic speaking countries is 25 and total diplomatic staff number is 135. 
That is to say, Turkey’s diplomatic relations in each mission are conducted averagely by 
5 people. Moreover, only 6 people were ability to speak in Arabic language among 135 
people in 2011.(Kutlay & Dinçer, 2012, 19) 
Civil society’s sharply increasing role in Turkey at a time when globalization has 
been felt each cell of relations and identity transformation of Turkey coupling with 
economic developments Turkish NGOs have intensified their humanitarian activities in 
the fields such as education, health and emergency relief. Increasing number of visitors 
and student from Middle Eastern countries increased popularity of Turkish TV series 
among the Arabs served as soft power instruments to strengthen Turkey’s positive 
image in the region.(Kutlay & Dinçer, 2012) 
3.4.3. Turkey’s Soft Power 
 
Before the Arab Spring, one of the convincing power components of Turkey was 
Turkey’s soft power capacity that was even caused interpretations as Turkey is an 
example country for Middle Eastern country. Since Justice and Development Party 
embraced multi-dimensional foreign policy approach and Middle East became focus of 
Turkey’s regional power implementations, the environmental changes occurred in the 
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global politics, as well. What it meant is that economic and military power sources as 
coercive tools had been appeared unsatisfactory in dealing with occurring problems, 
hence soft power approach that was theorized by Joseph Nye became useful in the 
deployment of country’s relations with the rest of the world. In this context, Joseph Nye 
(2013, 13) emphasized on the persuasion by using soft power sources which were 
indicated as “culture”, “political values”, “foreign policy”. Glancing at three sources of 
soft power, Turkey had huge cultural, political, religious and historical ties with Middle 
Eastern countries and more importantly Turkey’s appearance in the Islamic world as a 
modernized Muslim country together with relatively well functional democracy was 
causing to be paid attention on by Middle Eastern society and intellectuals.  
After Justice and Development Party whose roots traces back to Islamist movement 
had taken over government in 2002, an Islamist Party accelerated Turkey’s domestic 
reforms in accordance with the EU norms and revived failed Turkish economy 
providing remarkable economic growth lastly, adopted comprehensive new foreign 
policy approach. All these factors became influential in the emergence of Turkey’s soft 
power capacity.(Altunışık, 2010) 
Traditionally, Turkey’s entrenched problem of Cyprus issue together with 
secessionist aimed PKK terrorist organization made policy makers to be cautious by 
considering the national security issues which unsurprisingly made Turkey more 
aggressive to show its military muscles in any national security issues. It was quite 
noticeable by looking the armament race between Greece and Turkey and Turkey’s 
military deployment to Syrian border and its clear threat to Syrian regime due to 
presence of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan who were enjoying attacking Turkey by 
crossing Turkish border and turning its safe areas in Syria.  However, shifting internal 
factors in Turkish domestic politics and occurring external factors appeared as 
facilitating factors on Turkey’s rising soft power.(Oğuzlu, 2007) 
Especially, “balance between security and freedom” altered Turkey’s security 
culture by taking serious issues such as Kurdish Issue and the problems of religious 
minority into consideration which enabled Turkey to establish a new engagement with 
old foes.(Kalın, 2011) This understanding not only triggered Turkey to strengthen its 
ties with regional countries but also in paying special attention to Turkey’s political 
values it contributed enormous ideational source for its soft power capacity. In addition 
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to these, gained tendency to the EU-Turkey relations, domestic reforms in accordance 
with EU norms by an Islamic rooted party and most importantly decreasing influence of 
military on politics in Turkey shifted Turkey’s perception both in regional and global 
context. In collateral with these issues, externally emerging development around Turkey 
after 9/11 attacks, Turkey has been served as a model country in the Muslim world with 
its integrated economy to globalized world and success of compatibility between 
democracy and Islam.  
Turkey’s foreign policy approach should be considered together with its cultural 
basis in context of its soft power. First, Turkey’s shifting away from its traditional 
western oriented foreign policy understanding by strengthening its ties with Middle 
Eastern countries in terms of economic and politics has also led to improve cultural and 
social ties between each other. Considering Turkey’s regional engagement to the 
Middle Eastern countries problem as a Western country which had strongly slammed 
Western country’s stance in regional issues like Palestinian Question together with its 
seeking to strengthen socio-cultural interaction between Turkish society and Arab 
society by abolishing the visa restrictions, Turkey has been centralized and even 
perceived as the voice of Arab people as non-Arab country by Arabic society that 
provided enormous contribution Turkey’s soft power.  
Consequently, Turkey’s increasing soft power capacity can be easily noticed by 
looking at the number of three factors: number of visitors, number of incoming student 
and the rate of Turkey’s TV series in watching. According to numbers that were 
surfaced by leading Turkish think tank of USAK, Turkish TV series, which explicitly 
reflect the socio-cultural structure of Turkey’s, reached 85 million Arabic watchers by 
the TV series of “Gümüş” and 67 million people by the series of “Ihlamurlar 
Altında”.(Kutlay & Dinçer, 2012, 31) Indicators of incoming student from the Middle 
Eastern countries demonstrate that there were 1048 incoming students, whose rate 
appeared as %12,37 at overall, and there were no more than 20 students from Gulf 
countries. Hence, the number of incoming student from the Middle Eastern countries 
were quite limited and worse still there were no dialogue mechanism built by Turkey in 
order to keep contacts with those students.(Kutlay & Dinçer, 2012, 28) However, the 
number of visitor from Arab countries provided clear cut proof for Turkey’s appealing 
by reaching 3.6 million people in 2010 that was more than 3 times compared with the 
number of 2002.(Kutlay & Dinçer, 2012, 29) 
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At the onset of the Arab Spring, there was an intensified discussion regarding 
“Turkish Model”(Göksel, 2012; Taşpınar, 2003) which was demonstrated as an 
example for the Arab countries by considering Turkey’s democratic compatibility with 
Islam, globally integrated economic structure and socio-cultural environment. However, 
when Arab Spring erupted, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs deliberately announced 
that Turkey has intended allegations to be model for the Arab countries.(Gürsel, 2011) 
In this context, Turkey’s stability quest, socio-cultural interactions with the regional 
countries and most importantly its trade and investment opportunities in the region were 
featured points in Turkey’s angle in the beginning of the Arab Spring.  
In 2010, before the Arab Spring, Turkey, with its economic and ideational capacity, 
through being biggest economy, second biggest population, its motivated and activated 
civil society, most importantly Turkey’s pro-active and sensitive foreign policy 
approach in the Middle East. Moreover, as regional power theory indicated; acceptance 
by regional actors, claiming regional leadership as well as material and ideational 
resources, in 2010, Turkey demonstrated its regional leadership by taking place in such 
mediation effort and being sensitive on regional issues. Last but not least, Turkey was 
admitted as regional power with the indicator of its regional role, economic capacity 
and political structure by Arab people in different countries.(Akgün & Perçinoğlu, 
2010) 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
SAUDI ARABIA AS DEFENSIVE REGIONAL POWER IN THE MIDDLE 
EAST 
 
4.1. The Main Determinants of Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy 
 
Saudi Arabia’s role in international politics became more important both regionally 
and globally. From the discovery of rich oil reserves to its engagement to fight global 
terrorism after 9/11 attacks, Saudi Arabia plays a critical role in the international arena. 
Saudi Arabia’s affirmative and harmful contributions to regional and global issues 
cannot be denied, despite allegations of terrorist organizations damaging its reputation 
in international politics. 
Theoretically, domestic or environmental developments are vital in considering 
foreign policy, especially for government leaders who rule within an authoritarian 
regime. In this context, Saudi Arabia, a country ruled by a monarchical regime under a 
Kingdom, has always taken into account domestic concerns in drawing its foreign 
policy lines. It is also important to think about external threats when abolishing the 
security concerns in domestic politics, which at the end, are largely determined by 
domestic concerns. To sum up, the main determinants of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy 
are domestic security and external security. (Nonneman, 2006) 
In this context, the first question that should be answered is: what are the things 
that allow the Saudi Arabian regime to survive or what are the key factors in 
“legitimizing” Saudi Arabia’s regime in the domestic environment? The social 
acceptance of the Saudi Arabian regime can be accredited to five factors as indicated by 
Nonneman: “personal charisma”, “tradition and maintenance of values”, “patronage and 
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delivering quality of life”, “effective dealing with the outside world” and “performance 
as the protector of the Holy Places and of Islam in the Kingdom”. (Nonneman, 2006) As 
a matter of fact, Saudi Arabia’s increasing economic success for several years through 
its oil production can be included in these conditions since, with a possibility of a loss 
of economic benefits, which led citizens to question the legitimacy of the Saudi 
government. The second factor that is directly relevant to the domestic environment is 
influenced by regional developments and its transitional influences; those are regarded 
as external threats that would not only shake the regime but also be as effective as 
wiping out the regime itself. The fourth factor is directly related to the cost and benefit 
accounting of opportunities provided by the international system in order to either 
create a maneuver field for survival or constrain the ability to cement its existence.   
Considering the main determinants of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy together with 
external and internal security by drawing on Nonneman’s path, Saudi Arabia’s foreign 
policy approach will be evaluated with its historical context and we will pay special 
attention to core issues like Saudi-US Relations, Saudi Foreign Policy in the turbulent 
times of revolutionary waves, and the emergence of the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
Saudi Arabia's reaction to regionally effective revolutionary waves will be taken into 
account by glancing into the historical experiences in order to accurately grasp Saudi 
Arabia's foreign policy reaction to the Arab Spring. The following paragraphs will 
discuss how Saudi Arabia rationally approached regionally influential revolutionary 
waves from Nasser to the Iranian Revolution. 
4.2. Evolution of Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy 
 
After a very long struggle, the first state establishment failed in 1744 but at the end 
of WWI, Saudi Arabia was formed after the very turbulent period under the centenary 
alliance of the ruling Saud family and the religiously important Wahhabi ulama with the 
name of Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd. The Treaty of Jeddah signed on 20 May 1927 
with the United Kingdom secured an internationally important recognition for the 
Kingdom of Nejd and Hejaz. As soon as Hijaz was captured, the Saudi King centralized 
his power in order to modernize some part of the Saudi society so as to consolidate its 
realm. Yet, the Ikhwan movement, which occurred by settling Bedoui’s military ability 
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being utilized, did not appreciate these attempts and the first legitimacy crisis erupted in 
Saudi domestic politics between the Saudi regime and Ikhwan. The ensuing period of 
the stamping out of Ikhwan was a turning point in the history of the Wahhabiya and 
Saudi State. The Islamic scholars were no longer crucial in shaping important policies, 
despite the fact that some of the policies that were implemented by the Saudi state were 
controversial with the ulama’s consideration.(Steinberg, 2005, 24) 
Following a very rational decision to give up expanding Saudi penetration into 
British protected Iraq and Transjordan, the defeat of Ikhwan and thereby, ulama’s 
decreasing political influence ended up with a relatively centralized power of Saudi 
monarch. With its new name, Saudi Arabia grasped a novel chance to export oil, 
resulting in the birth of Saudi - US relations. Since the establishment of the Saudi state, 
the US did not pay considerable attention to Saudi Arabia until the American company 
Standard Oil of California (SOCAL) was permitted to explore and charge oil in the 
Saudi fields. Indeed, it became crystal clear that Saudi Arabia, as an oil rich country, 
was an economically favorable prospect for the U.S. The US cemented its relations as 
soon as it realized that Saudi Arabia was indispensable for US interest due to its 
location and resources during on the eve of the Cold War. Giving concession to SOCAL 
for charging oil fields in Saudi Arabia seemed like a rational approach for Saudis. In 
theeyes of theKing, Americans did not intend to alter political arrangements in the 
region, considering the domestic security concerns of Saudi Arabia along with the UK’s 
colonial keenness. 
Increasing economic relations on both sides have turned into strong political 
relations after it became clear that Saudi Arabia’s rich petrol reserves were crucial in 
supplying oil to US’s European alliance and its strategically important location was also 
vital for US containment policy. On the other hand, for Saudi Arabia, cementing 
relations with the US was reasonable because she was under possible danger of Soviet 
expansionism. Moreover, the US was the right country to have a deeper cooperation 
with in the bipolar international system because it was challenging the 
communist/officially atheist state, which ensured a leverage for Saudi’s to legitimate its 
relations in domestic environment with US. In order to cement the prevention of any 
external and internal legitimacy threats, the reason behind strong relations with the US 
is exclusively stemming from the security concerns of Saudi Arabia. 
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4.3. Regionally Effective Revolutionary Waves and Saudi Arabia 
 
4.3.1. Ascendance of Nasser to Power in Egypt 
 
In the bipolar international system, the US - Saudi Arabia’s alliance has confronted 
several major issues in both the regional and international contexts. The first major 
crisis erupted with the overthrow of King Farouk by Gamal Abdal Nasser and its 
transitional ideology in the Arab world from Morocco to the Gulf shores. A vital factor 
that attributed to Nasser’s rise to power was the support of the Soviet Union. It meant 
that the more Nasser penetrated into the Arab states with its ideological influence, the 
more Saudi Arabia and the US would have lost their regional influence. Moreover, it 
might have led to the end of the reign of the Saud family.  
Nasser’s ideology was mainly based on the balanced combination of two contrary 
and main streams of ideology in political science: nationalism and socialism. This 
interesting blend of socialism and nationalism, namely Nassarism in the Arab world, 
consisted of secular and nationalist revolutionary movements in the region. As a matter 
of fact, this ideational basis was reflecting Nasser’s regional ambitions to make Egypt 
the regional leader in the Middle East. In response, Egypt crucially entailed strong 
military equipment supported with heavy weapons, robust and sustainable independent 
economy, transitionally appealed ideology, and leverage on the world stage.(Feris, 
2012)The existence of the USSR as the main competitor of the US was a great chance 
for Nasser as well as having economic and military support for disseminating his 
ambitions under the name of Nasserism. The USSR’s support to Nasser irked both US 
and Saudi Arabia yet the latter was more vulnerable in confronting this ideology.   
Nasser’s increasing charismatic popularity in the Arab world, alliance with the 
Soviet Union, and ideational direct threat to monarchical Arab regime, emerged as a 
direct threat to both Saudi Arabia’s regime(Sharnoff, 2011) and the US’s influence on 
the Middle East through the Soviet inclusion over Egypt. For this reason, the US pushed 
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Saudi Arabia to become a regional leader in order to curb Nasser's penetration into the 
whole Arab world by its anti-western discourse. However, it was not ready to wrap 
itself in the Arabs’ leadership. Nevertheless, Saudi did its utmost to keep its present 
regime in North Yemen, which Nasser tried to annihilate. 
Even before Nasser’s emboldening of secular and national groups in North Yemen, 
the opposition group in Saudi Arabia was gradually forming due to the rise of a well-
educated middle class, the increase of nationalism in the Arab peninsula just after Arab-
Israeli conflict, and the effect of Nasser’s increasing transnational ideology.(Mordechai, 
1993)Additionally, following the  death of King Aziz, the emerging unrest of different 
social groups with different reasons put the King in a very difficult position to provide 
stability. In this context, the competition between Faisal and Saud to rule the country 
has created flexible alliances between challengers and demanding groups ranging from 
nationalists and reformist to fundamental conservatives and military. Hence, nationalists 
were never allowed to get rid of the reign and take over the government; their attempts 
of plotting against the reign and strikes on the streets were suppressed. During this 
period, Nasser’s successful attempt, which ended up with the unification of Egypt and 
Syria in 1958 under the United Arabic Republic, created hesitation among Saudi rulers 
who thought this revolutionary wave had suddenly appeared in their territory. Despite 
the fact that Saudi Arabia was not powerful enough to thwart the nationalist movement 
all around the region, it did its utmost when it came to its bordering region. Most 
importantly, it was Saudi Arabia’s first significant confrontation with the trans-
bordering revolutionary movement.   
In 1962, the military coup in Yemen erupted with the leadership of Abdullah Sallal, 
taking down a strictly conservative traditional oligarchic regime. This coup was a direct 
a result of the inspiration of Nasser’s successful military coup, which destroyed the 
monarchical regime. This attempt aroused sympathy among the Yemeni people and was 
supported even more by those who fled from the dictator Imam Ahmed regime to Cairo, 
embarking on the “Free Yemen” movement.(Yılmaz, 2009, 140) At that point, in 
Yemen, there was a huge divergence between republic supporter Arab nationalists and 
royalists, which eventually turned into a civil war in Yemen. It also fueled a proxy war 
between Saudi Arabia, who regarded this situation as a danger to its regime, and 
Nasser’s Egypt who had a dream to unite all Arab countries. 
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Thus, considering Nasser’s role in the Arab world together with the decline of his 
prestige due to the dissolution of the United Arab Republic, Nasser needed the 
opportunity to revitalize his glory in the Middle East. Therefore, he backed the Yemeni 
revolution and even sent armed forces to help this initiative. Yet as it had been 
predicted, ousted leaders fled to Saudi Arabia and launched a resistance movement 
against the military coup with substantial military assistance from Saudi Arabia that 
aimed at destroying the newly established republican government.(Katz, 1992) This 
proxy war concluded with a victorious Saudi Arabia and in 1967, Abdullah Sallal was 
taken down and replaced with Abdurrahman Iryani, who had inclined to continue very 
close relations with Saudi Arabia.  
As previously indicated, external threat is one of the main determinants of Saudis 
foreign policy. A regionally effective revolutionary wave, feared by the Saudi rulers, is 
one of the greatest challenges that Saudi Arabia may confront. Nasser’s ideology ignited 
a great challenge for Saudi Arabia to keep status quo in its interest but in a limited area. 
Yemeni civil war consisted of this limited frame and when the revolutionary wave hit 
Yemen, Saudi Arabia has militarily and economically propped up Yemeni loyal groups 
to keep the keep status quo in which the next revolution might been erupted.  A 
regionally effective revolutionary movement always remains the main challenge of 
Saudi Arabia due to lack of its offensive appealing idealistic viewpoints in the region. 
Nasser was the first serious experience of the Saudis but the following Iranian 
revolution, which became more persistent and prolonged, pushed Saudi Arabia to take 
more active leadership in the region.    
4.3.2. Iranian revolution 
 
The second regional development that concerned Saudi Arabia and the newly 
independent Gulf shore countries was the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Interestingly, this 
second important regionally effective wave did not stem from the Arabic land, but 
rather from its historical rival the Persian shores with the use of religious motives as 
pillars of ideology to shape the state structure under the name of “Islamic Republic”.  
With the Iranian revolution, Iran undertook the duty to protect all Muslims around the 
world. Despite the fact that Iran’s vision of itself seemed idealistic because protecting 
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the Islamic regime meant going beyond its borders, it could be interpreted as Iran being 
realistic because using this duty became a reason for them to expand to the Arab 
land.(Şahin, 2008) Iran’s dissemination resulted in the war between Iran and Iraq and 
caused the deepening of the sub-regional ties among the Gulf countries.  
In 1979, international politics faced several incidents in the regional and 
international context. Among these are the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan escalating the 
tension between two super powers in the globe and the US empowering the Islamist 
group in combating against the Soviet Union. In the regional context, the situation is 
much more complicated because political shifts in the region occurred consecutively. 
First, the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt through the mediation effort of the 
US was signed but consequently, Egypt became isolated in the Arab world. In addition 
to the isolation of this premier Arab country of Egypt, the Iranian Revolution triggered a 
new revolutionary wave throughout the Middle East but with limited effect.  
Remembering Nasser being bogged down in North Yemen along with his 
ideologies declining in the Middle East, there were two countries that could influence 
the regional balance in the Middle East at during the early 1970s: Iraq and Iran.(Yılmaz, 
2009, 257) Iran’s huge economic income through the success of its oil production for its 
Western allies during this decade became a propellant power behind the Shah’s regional 
ambitions, which aimed to reemerge the Persian Empire. Meanwhile, Iraq was 
undergoing considerable changes in the regional context under Ba’athist regime and 
was rapidly turning into a key player in the region.  
Iran had done its utmost to reach its regional goals, even to the point of annexing 
the three islands of the United Arabic Emirates. This annexation was completely 
incompatible within the interest of the Iraqis because these three islands were 
strategically important for Iraq since they provided control to the entrance of the Strait 
of Hormuz. Beyond this, both countries had shared border disputes and this situation 
occasionally caused agitation in their soft belly regions, namely Northern Iraq where 
Kurdish people were inhabited and Khuzistan, in which ethnic Arabic people were the 
majority.   
Iran’s aggressive policy in the Gulf region and its occupation of the islands, that 
belonged to the UAE, coupled with the Iranian “regime export” foreign policy approach 
greatly concerned the Gulf countries due to their Shia ethnic minorities and most 
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importantly, their monarchical regime. For Saudi Arabia, this revolution and Iran’s 
aggressive policy can be interpreted at two levels, as it was indicated in the theoretical 
perspective; the first is external security and the second is internal security, which is 
directly linked with domestic stability and legitimacy after the revolution.(Niblock, 
2004, 80)Despite the fact that both of Saudi Arabia’s security concerns are quite 
important, the latter is more dominant following Iranian revolution.  
In this context, unsurprisingly, since the beginning of Iran’s regional aggressive 
policy, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries inevitably economically and politically 
supported Iraq together in fighting against Iran so as to halt Iran’s aggressive 
policy.(Gresh & Vidal & Türe, 1991, 70) Nevertheless, the main reason behind Saudi 
Arabia backing Iraq is to prevention of the revolutionary wave coming out from Iran, 
which was direct threat to the existence of the regime. 
In addition to Saudi Arabia’s support of Iraq in the war against Iran, Saudi Arabia 
initiated intensifying regional relations with the Gulf countries because they shared the 
same kind of administrative structure in the organizational context in order to curb 
Iran’s regional ambitions and prevent a revolutionary wave in the region. The Gulf 
Cooperation Council, which was established with the incorporation of Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and the UAE, is the best illustration of what Saudi 
Arabia and the Gulf countries did in order to maintain the luxury of the regime and have 
regional stability.  
In this security featured sub-regional mechanism, six countries were jointly 
committed to defend any member country by declaring that if there is an attack in any 
of the member countries, it will be considered an attack to the rest of them as well. In 
this context, the Peninsula Shield force was formed under GCC as a military wing 
organization to deter or respond to the aggression against any member country in 1984; 
it was deployed very closely to the neighboring countries of Iraq and Kuwait. Relations 
among the countries not only progressed militarily, but also improved other aspects. 
Although this mechanism was created as a result of security concerns of member 
countries both in the domestic and external environments, it deepened their relations in 
various fields such from economy to culture. 
However, the Iranian revolution never became powerful enough to shift the regime 
in the Gulf region due to the war between Iran and Iraq and the precautions taken. 
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Interestingly, following the period when the Iraq and Iran war concluded, one of the 
major superpowers, the Soviet Union, was disappearing and disbanding. Iraq 
unilaterally invaded Kuwait by pretending a historical dispute with the country and 
exaggerating Kuwait’s oil production within OPEC. Saudi Arabia’s support of Iraq 
against Iran was an indispensable assistance since Iraq was insistently claiming regional 
leadership and most importantly, Iraq’s republican government structure was a most 
serious challenge, as well. However, this inconsistency between Saudi Arabia and Iraq 
was suspended at least for a while with the sudden appearance of a common Iranian 
threat. It was crystal clear after the Iranian revolution that Saudi Arabia perceived the 
Gulf monarchies as a backyard and created a mechanism for protecting them, GCC, in 
this context. Nevertheless, GCC was unable to deter Iraq’s invasion or respond to it by 
prompting collective security under itself. Before Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait relations were deteriorated by Kuwait’s shifting axis from Saudi 
Arabia and its regional role as peace broker. With the Kuwait’s invasion of Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia contributed an enormous amount of economic contribution, more than half of 
overall spending and provided a strategic air base to conduct military actions in order to 
pull back Iraqi soldiers from Kuwait. 
Nasser’s nationalist movement and Iranian regime export policy, along with 
regionally effective revolutionary waves, have seriously threatened Saudi Arabia’s 
domestic legitimacy which pushed it to take a tough stance including sending an army 
and supporting states in order to curb upcoming revolutionary waves. This historical 
background suggests us a trace in evaluating Saudi Arabia’s approach to regionally 
revolutionary waves which characterized it as a defensive actor due to the lack of 
ideational resources impacting state and non-state actors in the region. Hence, it should 
be stated here as a result that revolutionary waves that threat Saudis legitimacy will 
eventually confront a great resistance coming from Saudi Arabia. 
4.3.3. Post-Cold War Era and New Challenges for Legitimacy 
 
Following the end of the Cold War, there was a perception that US no longer 
needed any alliances because it was seen as the sole superpower in international 
politics, which coincided with the US expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait. For Saudi 
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Arabia, despite the fact that the Cold War gathered these countries in the same axis with 
the security concerns since the very beginning of relations, common interests such as 
preventing conflict from threatening the political status quo in the Persian Gulf and safe 
flow of oil resources to international markets, still continued strong.(Blanchard, 
2010)Nevertheless, it was gradually well understood and recognized that the relations 
among the countries were quite complex in the post-Cold War era. 
To liberate Kuwait, the U.S. soldiers were deployed in Saudi Arabia and Saudi 
Arabia air bases were used to expel Saddam from Kuwait. Deployment of the U.S 
soldiers in Saudi Arabia sparked an opposition movement, particularly, by strict 
conservative Muslims in domestic spheres. Even more, from the period Desert Storm to 
9/11, Saudi Arabia and even Gulf Countries like Qatar had been targeted several times 
by terrorist attacks due to their relations with the US. During the Cold War era, Saudi 
Arabia with the collaboration of the US, canalized substantial amount of financial and 
material resources to fighters combating against the Soviet Union. Now, after the Cold 
War, these people were fighting against US friends and Saudi Arabia itself.(Bronson, 
2006, 338)However, crucial relations ranging from energy issues to security had still 
remained positive though the relations were evolving rather slowly compared to the last 
five decades. In this environment, the beginning of the new millennium was witnessed 
unprecedented rifts between the US and Saudi relations and the 9/11 attacks, which 
targeted the World Trade Center and Pentagon with the affiliation of some Saudi 
citizens and the mastermind of Usama Bin Laden, who had already been granted as 
Saudi citizenship, shocked not only both sides but the rest of the world as well. The 
participation of Saudi citizens in the launch of the 9/11 attacks made the situation much 
more complicated. On the one hand, it seemed as if the Saudi Arabian government 
sponsored these terrorist attacks to some extent, but on the other hand, entrenched US- 
Saudi relations showed that Saudi Arabia substantially needed the US who had been a 
non-official protector of her regime. Even though the latter argument made sense and 
Saudi Arabia suddenly denied the allegations of its affiliation with the terrorist attacks, 
bilateral relations between Saudi Arabia and US inevitably deteriorated. This led to 
hesitations among the Saudis about being abandoned by historical ally in dealing with 
emerging threats. 
Terror on the global scale was also a “wake up call” for Saudis. Saudi Arabia was a 
special ally of the US together with Israel in the region and this was enough for Saudis 
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to be accused of being “apostates”. In this context, even before the 9/11 attacks, Bin 
Laden had always expressed his intention to overthrow Saudi reign to drive Saudi 
Arabia away from the West axis and launch internal reforms.(Cordesman & Obaid, 
2005) Bin Laden’s threat, interestingly, was opening the new discussion of the 
legitimacy of the Saudi reign with reference to Saudi Arabia’s special relations and its 
facilitation to the US. Especially, the bombing of a Muslim country with the help of 
another Muslim country, which includes the two main holy Muslim cities of Mecca and 
Medina provided motivation for recruiters to join Bin Laden’s movement. Hence, Saudi 
Arabia’s regime was once again under intimidation of Al Qaeda, which became an 
urgent problem for the country to tackle. (Teitelbaum, 2005) 
With the inception of the fight against global terror in Afghanistan by the American 
leadership, Afghanistan became unsecure for jihadist recruits who naturally returned 
back to the kingdom, organized sleeper cells and patiently waited for the right time 
inside the country. They were intentionally counting down for the right time that might 
activate people against the Saudi regime with the impending US military operation 
against Iraq. Therefore, the “third front”(Riedel & Saab, 2008) was believed to launch a 
fight against the “Muslim murderer” crusaders and would be able to overthrow the 
regime in Saudi Arabia with the support of mobilized Saudis.  
For abovementioned reasons, mushrooming terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia 
collateral with Iraq’s invasion by the US was no coincidence. No more than three 
months after the first bomb down in Iraq, Al Qaeda launched terrorist attacks using 
various methods like car bombing and targeting the regime itself and its alliances in 
Saudi Arabia. Owing to the activation of motivated sleeper cells against the regime, the 
Saudi government underwent to take tough measures in domestic spheres, deepening 
cooperation with international actors so as to root out terrorist activities. In this context, 
Saudi Arabia has initiated counterterrorism under three headlines: “The Men: 
Counterterrorism”, “The Money: Combating Terror Financing”, “The Mindset: 
Overcoming Extremism”.(Saudi Embassy, 2015) In this regard, Saudi Arabia forged 
cooperation with international actors, provided international seminars on how to prevent 
money transfer to terrorism affiliated people, how to indoctrinate people, who 
previously attended terrorist action, how to stay away from terrorism through 
psychological treatment. 
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Just before the Arab Spring, apart from its tiny legitimacy problem in domestic 
spheres, external ideological threats like the Iranian revolution and democratic 
transformation in long distances countries, which were less effective till the Arab 
Spring, continued to be serious challenges for Saudi Arabia. In addition to these, the 
growing influence of Iran on certain state and non-state actors was carrying potential 
threat to ignite Shia uprising in Saudi Arabia. Last but not least, because radical 
movements gained currency since the demise of the Cold War together with the internal 
dynamics of Saudi Arabia, radical groups that possessed their legitimacy from religious 
values appeared as a crucial problem to be tackled by Saudis.  
4.4. The Regional Role and Regional Power Dimension of Saudi Arabia 
 
Saudi Arabia has always given its utmost efforts so as to curb regionally effective 
revolutionary waves, which became very efficient in shaping its foreign policy but also 
restrained maneuverability. Furthermore, the bipolar structure of the international 
system and entrenched alliance with the United States against officially atheist the 
Soviet Union did not allow the enlargement of its foreign policy horizon. However, 
Saudi Arabia’s role in enforcing Islamists group to keep its interests aligned with US’ in 
different areas was undeniable. Nevertheless, none of them made Saudi Arabia one of 
the major regional actors in the Middle East perpetually standing as a secondary 
regional power following Turkey, Egypt and Iran. Nevertheless, with the end of the 
Cold War and the dismantling of its restrictions, economic considerations became more 
influential in defining relations in the rapidly changing global environment, whereas 
military considerations were crucial during the Cold War. In this context, Saudi Arabia 
gradually increased its economic capacity which enabled her to increase its military 
weight and appear as a defensive regional power in the Middle East.  
Owing to its legitimacy problem in domestic sphere, compering its political and 
economic weights with other regional countries, Saudi Arabia had been very weak in 
dealing actively with regional issues and it never took active leadership to shape the 
whole region in accordance with its interests, always defined its approach from the 
defensive perspective. However, since it became crystal clear that Iran embraced an 
aggressive policy aimed at wiping out the existing regime in the Gulf region which 
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surfaced ideological differences in both shores of the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia 
launched to quest for regional supremacy in the Gulf region.(Amirahmadi, 1993) In this 
context, Saudi Arabia actively initiated the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council that consolidated collective security among the member countries and 
strengthened relations in various fields so as to balance the emerging Iranian threats. On 
Saudi Arabia’s role and capacity, it could even be said that Saudi Arabia is a “sub-
regional hegemony“ on the Gulf countries with its domination of these countries. 
Hence, Saudi Arabia’s active role establishing a mechanism in which considerable oil 
resources are located is clear cut proof of the admission of Saudi Arabia’s leadership by 
the other members.  
Economically, Saudi Arabia benefited very effectively from its rich oil resources 
and this not only provided leverage in shaping its relations with other countries, but also 
caused Saudis to get substantial amount of money through black gold. Despite the fact 
that oil is a crucial resource for industrialized countries which has to be consumed by 
them to keep their robust economic conditions, there is also negative side to the 
production of oil: Saudi Arabia’s economy that is being extensively dependent on oil 
revenues. Considering that oil consumption is increasing each day, it could be easily 
concluded that as long as Saudi Arabia maintains its ties with major consumers, the oil 
revenues will be stabile. However, this does not prevent the social muttering due to the 
lack of enlargement in economic fields. In this context, Saudi Arabia initiated 
institutionalization in order to enlarge economic activities from tourism to investment 
opportunities and for this aim, considerable lawful steps, which were entailed to appeal 
foreign investors, were enacted so as to create new economic spheres.(Malik & Niblock, 
2005) 
Despite its objection to the Iraqi War in 2003 due to geopolitical concerns, the war 
inevitably increased oil prices which resulted in a sudden boom of Saudi Arabian 
economy since 2003. Instability in Iraq which is one of the main suppliers together with 
emerging economies’ oil demand like China provided uninterrupted economic growth, 
averaging approximately at 7.5% annual growth between 2003 and 2011 omitting the 
world economic crisis in 2009. Its GDP per capita of 9.070 USD in 2003 soared to 
21.210 USD, likewise its total GDP of 214.5 billion USD in 2003 to 669.5 billion USD 
in 2011.(World Bank) This economic boom made Saudi Arabia the second biggest 
economic power in the Middle East, just after Turkey.  
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Thinking of Saudi Arabia’s growing oil income together with its surfacing political 
role in the Arab and Muslim worlds as the protector of the two Muslim holy cities in its 
territory, Saudi Arabia stands out as a respected and brave country in dealing with the 
Arab people’s emerging problems in the last two decades. Especially, when Saudi 
Arabia got actively involved in regional issues at the beginning of 2000s and took the 
very bold initiative of trying to solve the Palestinian Question. Saudi Arabia, with the 
Saudi Peace, also known as the Crown Prince Abdullah Peace Plan, proposed the 
pullout of Israeli soldiers the territories that have been occupied since 1967, to the 
expense of the normalization of the relations between Israeli state and Arab states.  The 
peace plan brought nothing new to the other proposed peace initiatives of the past, but 
the proposition coming out from Saudi Arabia was significant. Saudi Arabia was 
assumed Saudi Arabia to be the last country to establish diplomatic relations with Israel 
due to its ultra-conservatism.(Füller, 2002) Although the peace plan was failed to reach 
its goal, it was enormously important for Saudi Arabia to never be excluded from the 
Arab world after taking bold steps for the peace deal. In addition to this, Saudi Arabia 
mediated Hamas and Fatah to form a Palestinian unity government and to a large extent, 
accomplished this through its financial aids and regional role. On one hand, Saudi 
Arabia’s initiative, even astonished to the US because it desired HAMAS to be kept in 
isolation. On the other hand, HAMAS’s driving away to Iran’s axis was prevented by 
Saudi Arabia. Consequently, this mediation effort with the Mecca Accord highlights 
two important things; first Saudi Arabia desired to deepen the Palestinian’s admission 
of an initiated peace plan and, secondly, it did not leave the ground to Iran through 
accepting HAMAS as a legal actor. Rather, imitating the US, it demonstrated its self-
ascribed regional leadership.(Kamrava, 2014)Both non-state and state actors have 
recognized Saudi Arabia’s leadership in the region, especially in its neighboring 
countries, which have generally followed the Saudi foreign policy. Apart from this 
crucial attempt, Saudi Arabia has been a very active player in supporting the political 
inclusion of Sunni groups in Iraq in post-construction period of Iraq’s political structure. 
In Lebanon, in order to crackdown Iran’s influence over Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia 
provided enormous economic and politic support in order to make the government 
stronger in responding to Hezbollah’s attempt to dominate Lebanon. Yet, stability has 
been the main consideration of Saudi Arabia and due to this reason, Saudi Arabia 
mediated to gather all Lebanese factions in order to reach a stable environment, as well. 
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Saudi Arabia’s domestic and external security concerns, especially stemming from 
Iran since the Iraqi invasion of the US that deepened Iran’s influence in Iraq, always left 
it to stay on the knife-edge. Hence, Saudi Arabia, by benefitting from its economic 
inputs, has blindly scattered money in order to build up and modernize its military 
muscles. In this context, at just the very beginning of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia’s 
military spending was up to 45.245 billion USD, making it the 9th biggest consumer in 
the world after very developed countries.(SIPRI)Two years after the inception of the 
Arab Spring, in 2013, Saudi Arabia hailed as the 4th most military spending country in 
the world with its 67 billion USD worth of military spending after preeminent 
superpowers like the US, China and Russia.(CNN Türk, 2014) Just before the Arab 
Spring, Saudi Arabia with its gigantic budget became the most spending country in the 
Middle East, which does not necessarily mean that it has the most powerful army in the 
region. However, the military might of a defensive regional power is a substantially 
important indicator of its material resources that displays its regional power role. 
Consequently, Saudi Arabia’s material resources of economic and military might 
make it one of the three powerhouses in the region. Its gargantuan defense spending and 
its overwhelmed economic resources enlarged its maneuverability in the region over 
state and non-state actors. Yet, its lack of ideological sources made it vulnerable against 
revolutionary waves and caused to be defined as defensive regional power in the Middle 
East so that in the abovementioned parts Saudi’s soft power is omitted. Finally, a year 
before the eruption of the Arab Spring, according to the 2010 TESEV report of 
Turkey’s perception of the Middle East, Saudi Arabia has been regarded as the biggest 
economy and second most appealing actor in the region.(Akgün & Perçinoğlu, 2010) 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONTRADICTORY LEADERSHIPS 
 
5.1. The Arab Spring 
 
When a street fruit vendor, Muhammed Buazizi, set himself on a fire to protest 
constabulary’s insulting attitudes on his livelihood activity, he was highly possibly no 
aware of that he sparked a revolutionary wave under the discourse of democracy, 
freedom and dignity throughout the region. After Buazizi’s fire, streets were occupied 
to protest government and eventually ended up with the toppling of 23 years old Bin 
Ali’s reign in Tunisia, 30 year old Hosni Mubarak government in Egypt. Now, there 
were small and considerably important protests all around the Arab countries from 
Lebonan to Libya, Syria to Yemen. These revolutionary waves under the democratic 
demands were gone down in history as “the Arab Spring” by experts, academics and 
even countries.  
All of a sudden emergence of the Arab Spring, following the toppling down of Bin 
in Tunisia Ali and Mubarak in Egypt, Fall of Berlin Wall was reminded and “Arab Wall 
Begins to Fall”(Halimi, 2011) was used to explain situation unfolding the region. 
Additionally, investigation of regimes’ legitimacy, demanding democratic right in the 
Arab streets with emerging opposition groups opened up a discussion whether these 
developments should be taken into account in the “Democracy’s Third 
Wave”(Huntington, 2011; Sarıhan, 2012) or the inception of fourth wave of democracy 
mentioning the Samuel Huntinghton’s theory.(Diamond, 2011) 
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However, this so called “Arab Spring” has been continued with its ups and downs. 
Especially, after dispatching rancid governments in Tunisia and most importantly in 
Egypt, it was believed Arab society under oppressor regime could change their 
government in response to their social, political and economical confrontations. The 
resistance of Gaddafi in Libya not to give in for political transformation exacerbated the 
civil war and agitated with the NATO’s military intervention. Likewise, in Bahrain, 
whose majority consist of Shia ethnic groups ruled by Sunni minority, protests were 
harshly responded. A transition government in Yemen brokered by Saudi Arabia but 
that did not enable Yemen to be stabile. In Syria, the Arab Spring entered a new phase 
and protracted civil war which ended up over 3 million refugees, as of November 2014, 
and 6.5 million internally displaced people, as of May 2014, and unfortunately 
approximately 200.000 people(BBC, 2014) have lost their life till November 2014. 
In this nested and complex environment, regionally powerful countries have 
calibrated their foreign policy tools in accordance with the possible geopolitical 
consequences.  However, the prediction of the Arab Spring’s direction was quite 
complicated for regionally influential countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and 
Israel to shape their foreign policy approaches. For Israel, just after Mubarak who is 
loyal ally of the US and good man in Cairo for Israelis, security concerns suddenly 
soared because elections that will be held in Egypt in order to provide political 
transition possibly could elevate the anti-Israeli groups to government that meant the 
loss of Israel’s solely reliable and valuable ally in the region.(Ayoob, 2012) Being a 
good example of HAMAS take over in Gaza by democratic elections is behind this 
security consideration. With the same logic, Iran interpreted the developments 
upholding the Middle East as a resurgence of Islamism being against the west and new 
front opening to tackle effectively with western countries. In addition, Iran was 
supposed there will eventually be Islamic republic export in Arab Spring countries, yet 
it was turned a complex issue when Arab Spring reached Iran’s most important Arab 
ally of Syria that shifted Iran’s point of view on the Arab Spring.(Rafati, 2012)Iran’s 
regional rival, Saudi Arabia has also regarded Arab Spring as, on the one hand, a threat 
to its regime’s stability but on the other hand considered as an opportunity to reduce 
Iranian influence when Arab Spring arrived to Syria. In addition to that, Saudi Arabia 
dispatched the soldiers, under the GCC auspicious, to Bahrain in which ruling group is 
Sunni minority as the vast majority of populations is Shia in order to surpass the Shia 
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demonstrations in Manama. Saudi Arabia implemented some measurements against 
revolutionary wave of the Arab Spring both domestically and regionally, accepting the 
Arab Spring as external and internal threats for regime’s existence. To some extent, the 
perception of these countries was reflecting the security concern of them emerging from 
the Arab Spring. Yet, for Turkey, there was neither a security concern in terms of its 
regime and political structure nor a direct military concern. Nevertheless, that is not to 
say that Turkey has no possible loosing in its approach towards the Arab Spring. As a 
county who had been defined as exemplary county with its political structure and 
compatibility between democracy and Islam in the Middle East region, there were two 
possibilities when Arab Spring spread into the countries where Turkish foreign policy’s 
trading state mentality stake at its zenith, namely in Syria and Libya. This was such a 
dilemma that Turkey has confronted and had to choose either ethical approach which 
pushes Turkey to foster political transformation or self interest that made Turkey to 
continue enjoying its trade and investment opportunity.(Öniş, 2012) Consequently, 
Turkey as a major regional power projected to promote democratization in the region 
with siding people’s demand of dignity and freedom at the Arab streets. 
As a main focus of this thesis, since the inception of Arab Spring, there was a 
divergence of Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Especially, Ankara’s responses to 
developments in North Africa and the Middle East became gradually coherent with 
principled foreign policy approach whereas Riyadh viewed the Arab Spring movements 
with domestic security concern and skepticism.(Ennis & Momani, 2013)From now on, 
these two countries contradictory leaderships in the Arab Spring will be analysis in the 
context of “contradictory leaderships”. While Turkey’s regional projection will be taken 
into account with its democracy promotion approach in general terms with excepting 
Bahrain in which Turkey pragmatically applied to real-politic by recognizing its 
limitations, as a defensive and rational regional power Saudi Arabia’s defensive 
regional projections will be evaluated in three context; containment, revolutionary and 
counter-revolutionary.(Steinberg, 2014) Turkish and Saudi projections for the Arab 
Spring provide also an understanding “how emerging powers conduct foreign policy 
under conditions of uncertainty”.(Ennis & Momani, 2013) 
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5.2. Contradictory Leaderships of Turkey and Saudi Arabia During the Arab 
Spring 
 
5.2.1. Bahrain: The Limitations of Regional Powers 
 
Following the downfall of Bin Ali and Mubarak, the Arab Spring’s subsequent 
serious station finally became Bahrain’s ruler is Sunni minority whereas the majority of 
citizens are Shii. Saudi Arabia erects as a gigantic hegemonic power there and as a 
balancer against the Iranian influence in the country. The Shia led uprising in Bahrain 
alerted Saudi Arabia to take a tough stance, since it was supposed that the turmoil 
ignited by Iran. The fear of Saudi Arabia was that if a sustainable revolution prevailed 
in Bahrain, this would embolden the Shia minority in Saudi Arabia.(Johnston, 2011) 
No doubt, the Bahrain case in the Arab Spring was a clear-cut proof in showing the 
limits of a regional power within the respective region. Since the foundation of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, its main aim has been both to maintain any legitimate trouble and 
to balance between Iran and the Gulf monarch countries in order to curb the Iranian 
ambitions of dominating the region. Shia led demonstrations caused Saudi Arabia to 
confront both challenges, simultaneously. After all, as a hegemon that has been 
conducive in building the GCC mechanism that provides a legitimacy to intervene, not 
surprisingly, Saudi Arabia demonstrated its military muscles to halt demonstrations 
against Sunni rulers. Saudi Arabia’s harsh intervention in Bahrain has led to a bloody 
outbreak and crashed oppositions in the street.  
Turkey, that had already calibrated its political vision during the Arab Spring as a 
supporter of democratic demands throughout the region had to face off the realpolitik 
that its influence in the Gulf was very low. In addition to this, direct investments and 
flows of money from Gulf Countries was occupying a very considerable share in 
Turkey’s growing economy. Having no sectarian agenda in its diplomatic relations with 
Middle Eastern countries, Turkey, as a champion of democracy promotion during the 
Arab Spring has not been able to lash out against Saudi Arabia’s intervention to 
Bahrain. As a matter of fact, the Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan has spoken out against 
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Saudi Arabia’s military intervention in Bahrain, saying “we do not want to see new 
Kerbelas”(Analiz Merkezi, 2011), though he did not go beyond this discourse. 
The meeting of the Turkish Prime Minister, who urged the resignation of Mubarak 
and propped up the opposition group in Syria, with the Bahraini King caused Turkey to 
be accused of having double standards in its regional politics, especially compared with 
the Syrian case.(Vahedi, 2011) Turkey’s calm attitude towards Bahrain even caused the 
upholding of allegations that Turkey pursues a sectarian agenda in its regional 
engagement. Yet, considering exclusively the Bahraini case, claims that Turkey had a 
sectarian agenda or double standards were inaccurate because Saudi Arabia’s sub-
regional mechanism that allows it to carry out a collective security not only undermined 
Turkey’s approach but also the EU and the US’s democracy agenda.(Hassan, 2015) 
It was the Realpolitik that Turkish policy makers have considered in approaching 
the development in the Bahraini case. Turkey’s awareness of Saudi Arabia’s non-
tolerant change attempts in its near periphery and its strong economic ties with the Gulf 
countries were, certainly, calculated by Turkish foreign policy makers and the 
limitations of Turkey’s regional power projections had been drawn. Iran, having a 
sectarian agenda and custodian of the Shii population in the region was also curbed and 
confined by Saudi Arabia.  
5.2.2. Egypt: A Great Confrontation 
 
When the protests began in Tunisia, there was no considerable attention by both 
Turkey and the international community. The happenings left a shock effect on policy 
makers. However, when the Arab Spring hit Egypt as a transformative political wave, 
strategies had already been taking shape in regional and international countries. Turkey 
considered the Arab Spring as the third major earthquakes in the international system 
since the Cold War, together with the economic crisis of Europe. (Davutoğlu, 2013) 
Thinking of this earthquake together with Davutoğlu’s “flow of history” understanding, 
Turkey had no chance but support people’s struggle for dignity, honor and freedom. 
Turkey had to be on the right side of the flow of history and decided to back the trans-
boundary regional revolutionary wave.(Aras, 2014) Thus, Turkey raised its discourse in 
normative perspectives, by promoting western oriented values of democracy and human 
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rights in response to the demands of people for better governance from their 
authoritarian rulers in the Arab streets. In Egypt, it was brought to public attention that 
Turkey had started the “promotion of democracy”.(Kardaş, 2011) 
In the case of Egypt, when Tahrir Square started flooding with massive 
demonstrations, the Turkish government and the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan explicitly urged Hosni Mubarak to resign in order to meet with the legitimate 
demands of the Egyptian people. The Turkish government considered that a democratic 
transformation throughout the region could create a more stabile environment and solve 
the legitimacy problem of authoritarian regimes. Therefore, Turkey could get involved 
in the region more effectively by relying on democratic political structure. Therefore, 
following the fall of Bin Ali, Turkey never hesitated to take side with the people and 
their demands to change the regime or government. From a trading state perspective, 
Turkey’s lack of extensive investments in Egypt made it easy forth country to determine 
its position during the Egyptian Turmoil.(Tocci, 2011) 
For Saudi Arabia, the Arab Spring’s hit to Egypt not only proved why the 
revolutionary waves should be taken seriously. Egypt had always been the center of the 
Arab World and any serious change in Egypt would be as effective as the Nasser 
experience in the past, but also that Egypt was the loyal ally of the Western system that 
enabled Saudi Arabia to strengthen its ties against Iran and its influence in Gaza, 
Lebanon and Syria. There would be considerable strategic and symbolic challenges if 
Mubarak was to fall down in Egypt; first the ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood 
who represents Sunni Islam, and which would be Saudi Arabia’s only serious Sunni 
challenger from the Arab lands in terms of governance, second that Egypt could direct 
its way towards Iran which would shake the regional balance of power in favor of Iran 
against Saudi Arabia.(Al Tamamy, 2012) 
Mubarak in Egypt was clearly a loyal partner of US in the Middle East and had 
been propped up economically, militarily and politically for at least three decades. 
However, along with the upholding of the Arab Spring, there was an emerging dilemma 
on the US side about the Egyptian case. The US could either urge Mubarak to take 
demands for democracy into consideration or to continue back the Mubarak regime, 
which the US benefitted from for 30 years. Together with the US role in Egypt, there 
was also another important actor whose decision on the demonstrations was vital: the 
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Egyptian army. Saudi Arabia had assumed that both the Egyptian Army and the US, 
would do their utmost to hold Mubarak in power. However, first the Egyptian Army 
declared that they would never use the force against the Egyptian people and then the 
US President Barack Obama urged Mubarak to organize free and fair elections and not 
to run for the next elections.(CNN, 2011)The US’s turning its back to Mubarak raised 
concerns in Saudi Arabia, who was also a historical partner of the US in the region that 
could confront the Arab Spring. Thus, Saudi Arabia’s confidence in the US was 
damaged. 
The downfall of Mubarak and the sudden ascendance of Muslim Brotherhood to 
the government, following the first ever democratic elections in the Egyptian history 
caused the increase of Saudi concerns concerning Saudis’ domestic and regional 
considerations. The Muslim Brotherhood is cross-border but fragmented within itself in 
each country’s civil society organizations. It is also one of the most motivated and 
active political organizations. Its success in both parliamentarian and presidential 
elections in a country like Egypt, which is an source of inspiration for the Arab world, 
was interpreted as an alarming situation in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, democratic accordance 
together with Islamic values in the heartland of the Arab world, Egypt, would accelerate 
and revive the demands of people for change and its eventual regional and domestic 
repercussions would harm the legitimacy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. For this 
reason, Saudi Arabia’s approach to the Muslim Brotherhood was very hostile from the 
moment they took over the government to the military coup led by General Abdel 
Fattah Al-Sisi on July 3rd2013.  
Contrary to Saudi Arabia, the ousting of Mubarak, who had already been urged to 
resign by the Prime Minister Erdoğan, was welcomed by Ankara. In addition to this, the 
holding of the first free and democratic elections in Egypt was regarded as an 
opportunity window for Turkish decision makers to wipe out legitimacy problem in the 
capital of Arab World and it would also be conducive in overcoming structural Middle 
Eastern problems and strengthening ties between Turkey and Arab countries. The 
Muslim Brotherhood’s taking over the government in Egypt was also a very crucial 
development for Turkey in terms of identity politics. Just like the ruling Justice and 
Development Party in Turkey, the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology stemmed from 
Islamist movements and leading the government with democratic legitimacy. Turkey’s 
appearance as a role model country enabling an accord between Islam and democracy 
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together with Turkey’s new principled zero problems with neighbors,  overlapped with 
Turkey’s expectations of serving people’s legitimate demands and a more inclusive and 
with the inclusion of people into the government. 
The democratic transformations in Egypt had been financially and politically 
propped up by Turkey, extending a helping hand of 2 billion USD to bridge the budget 
deficit(Reuters, 2012) and inviting the newly elected President Morsi as honorary 
visitor to the Justice and Development Party’s convention in Turkey. Just 45 days after 
this convention, Prime Minister Erdoğan visited Egypt and discussed the forefront crisis 
of Israel’s Operation Pillar of Defence in Gaza. Both leaders publicly announced their 
full support to the Palestinians people and slammed Israel’s attack.(Hürriyet Daily 
News, 2012) Turkey’s inspiration for Egypt and convergence of foreign policy 
approaches on sensitive issues put both sides in a path of developing strong ties that 
certainly started to change the balance of the region. Turkey’s promotion of democracy 
and human rights since the eruption of the Arab Spring together with the inception of 
democratic consolidation in the inspirational heartland of the Arab world, would be 
direct a threat to the Gulf countries’ limited legitimacy.(Hearst, 2013) 
After all, Egypt had been the mainland for the “regional leadership contest”(Cook 
& Stokes and & Brock, 2014, 4-5) between Turkey and the Gulf countries except Qatar 
that sided with Turkey on one hand, and the UAE and Saudi Arabia on the other. The 
rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and its possible repercussions on the region irritated 
Saudi Arabia enough that they provided huge economic and political assistance to 
Abdel Fettah Al-Sisi, who led the military coup in Egypt on July 3rd, 2013. After the 
sudden military coup, Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah together with Kuwait and the UAE 
pledged to provide 12 billion USD worth of economic aid and urged Western countries 
not to impose any sanctions by notably implying that they would compensate any 
sanction on Egypt.(Reuters, 2013) The counter-revolutionary movement in Egypt 
exposed already presents intra-regional challenges between Turkey and Saudi Arabia.  
Not surprisingly, the Turkish government came out as the most vocal critic of 
Egyptian coup, pulling back its ambassador from Egypt and, calling western countries 
to comply with their values against military coups. The rift between Turkey and Saudi 
Arabia over Egypt caused a new “Cold War” between two Sunni countries, interpreted 
as the conflict between “Islamic Wahhabism and Islamic democracy”(Al Buluwi, 2014) 
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In this comparison, the evolution should go beyond the Islamic Wahhabism since  there 
was a clear anxiousness about Islamic democracy in Saudi Arabia. It was also publicly 
announced by the Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan that Saudi Arabia was “a part of 
coup in Egypt”, a “hypocrite”.(Ergin, 2013) On both sides, there was also a very active 
media row, accusing Saudi Arabia of being part of the “evil axis” on one hand, and 
identifying Turkish Prime Minister as “Sultan” on the other.(Al Rasheed, 2013) 
Turkey’s critical voice and Saudi Arabia’s supportive actions to Abdal-Fattah Al-
Sisi continued and the competition was picked up on global stages on the occasion of 
Turkey’s bid for temporary membership in the UN Security Council for 2015 and 2016. 
The Turkish government never hesitated to carry the Egyptian case on to the 
international stage and Turkish President Erdoğan directed harsh criticism to those who 
kept silence and legitimized Al-Sisi instead of Morsi in his speech at the UN General 
Assembly. Turkey’s active role in setting an agenda on Egypt confronted with Saudi 
Arabia’s active play to curb Turkey’s ambition to be part of the UN Security Council 
and, eventually, Saudi Arabia launched an intensive campaign against Turkey’s 
membership.(Avni, 2014) 
Egypt signifies a verisimilitude of clashes between regional powers when it comes 
to the crucially important topic that is vital for the region itself, albeit there were 
convergence of common interests in dealing with other regional issues and increasing 
mutual dependency on each side. This also shows the importance of the balance of 
power in the region. For Saudi Arabia, losing Turkey in a time of US disassociate itself 
from the region would be a handicap for it in balancing Iran’s regional hegemony 
ambitions, by activating local militias. Aside from this, the Egyptian case demonstrates 
how the regional powers’ projections to the responding region can be very different and 
how another regional power can curb the leadership by launching opposite leadership. 
5.2.3. Syria: “Bitter Frenemies” 
 
As the Arab Spring landed in Syria, geo-politic realities clearly surfaced in which 
three materially and ideationally powerful states of Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran 
embraced three different paths in their way of dealing with the Syrian Crisis. For Saudi 
Arabia looking with the sectarian lens, weakening the government in Damascus and 
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replacing it by a more moderate one meant the weakening of Iran in the broader context. 
Likewise, for Iran, Damascus continuous presence in the axis of Iran is crucial to supply 
all necessities of proxy Shia groups supported by Iran from Iraq to Lebanon. Yet, for 
Turkey, there was no sectarian agenda, though there was a choice of real-politic 
between Turkey’s economic interests in Syria and the morally supported democratic 
transformation. Turkish policy makers adopted for the latter.  
Analyzing the Syrian crisis is very complicated because, though it once seemed 
like Turkey and Saudi Arabia shared common goals to provide a change of regime, it 
was obvious that both actors prop up different segments of the Syrian opposition which 
are thought to shape the future order in Syria. Thus, since the very beginning of the 
Syrian Crisis, there have been structural differentiations between Saudi Arabia and 
Turkey’s considerations. Gause expressed this situation as follows; 
“The inability of Turkey and Saudi Arabia to form a powerful axis in 
opposition to Assad in Syria and Iranian influence in the region more 
generally can be attributed, in part, to an intra-Sunni Islamist dispute over 
political order.”(Gause, 2014, 17) 
Looking from the Saudi perspective, a decade before the Arab Spring, there had 
been a considerable growing Iranian influence. The invasion by US and subsequent 
elections brought a Shia dominated government in Iraq. The failure of the Saudi’s 
support of Hariri against Hezbollah in Lebanon, the steady increase of the Shia 
originated Houthi movement in Yemen and the Arab Spring that toppled down a 
Mobarak, major ally of Saudi Arabia, gave only an opportunity for Saudis in Syria to 
weaken the Iranian influence.(Gause, 2014, 15)The Saudis’ frustration was exacerbated 
by the ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood to government which presented a 
different path in the Arab-Islamic world. With the onset of the Syrian upheaval, the 
Muslim Brotherhood occupied the front side in demanding a better governance based on 
elections like in Egypt and Tunisia. Despite having a strategic chance to weaken the 
Iranian influence, Saudis might have also confronted a situation in which the Muslim 
Brotherhood would take over two governments with democratic legitimacy, which 
would mean a new version of Nasserism, a direct threat to Saudi Arabia’s monarchy. 
Thus, Saudi Arabia shunned away any segment of the Muslim Brotherhood, supported 
Salafi movements by differentiating them from radical groups and took a clear stance 
against the Assad regime. 
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In Bahrain, Turkey’s role was very low and the country took a position considering 
its regional limitations from realpolitik perspectives. It was also fact that there were no 
actors except Saudi Arabia able to meddle strongly into the Bahraini case. Yet, in Syria, 
Turkey, as a moral and democracy defender champion since the eruption of the Arab 
Spring, confronted a serious dilemma, posing between self-interest and moral 
obligations. Unlike Saudi Arabia and Iran, Turkey had no sectarian agenda and no 
security considerations stemming from its domestic environment. Thereby, it might 
have sided with Assad for the sake of its enormous trade interests and Syria’s strategic 
importance as a gateway to the Arab land. In the beginning of the demonstrations in 
Syria, Turkish government called the Syrian leader to hear the voices and reform in 
accordance with the demands coming out of the Syrian streets. In this context, it was 
even interpreted that Ankara would not go beyond the democratization discourse and it 
was said that “Turks are unlikely to abandon their man in Damascus”(Cook, 2011) 
Nevertheless, the brutal oppression of the Syrian against the demonstrator irked Turkey 
which eventually cut off relations and supported opposition groups, both politically and 
financially.  
Turkish and Saudi governments not only diverged in their geo-politic 
considerations toward the Syrian crisis, the first prioritized democratization and the 
latter considered sectarianism, but also in their support of different opposition groups. 
For the post-Assad era, Turkey envisioned a participatory mechanism including all the 
fragmentation of Syria so as to prevent a possible blow up due to the lack of democratic 
consolidation among political groups, however Saudi Arabia advocated Sunni Islamist 
governments with more radical elements in the country.(Altunışık, 2012) Since the fear 
against the Muslim Brotherhood, for the projection of the reconfiguration of Syria after 
Assad, expecting a government that the Muslim Brotherhood are kept at bay or curbed 
them, by Saudi Arabia, to control all segments of the government came as no 
surprise.(Eyal, 2012) 
This regional competition between Turkey and Saudi Arabia both in Egypt and 
Syria drove Qatar and the United Arabic Emirates close to each side, respectively. As a 
follower of Turkey’s regional policy, even in the Gulf region there have been serious 
setbacks among Gulf countries, in particular Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE against 
Qatar, even though they were firmly tied in pondering against Iran.(Hassan, 2013) In 
Syria, this discord has been prevented to unify opposition groups to tackle more 
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effectively with Assad’s cruel acts and so that the fragmented opposition groups more 
weakened on the ground and eventually radical elements became very active on the 
stage.  
The Syrian crisis not only demonstrated the intra-regional constraints, but also 
signified the limitations of both regional powers stemming from domestic and global 
dynamics. First, Turkey has never been able to conduct military intervention in favor of 
its interests due to domestic limitations the public has supported any military 
intervention and most importantly Russia’s unlimited support and the lack of UN 
Security Council resolutions did not allow any military intervention by Turkey in Syria. 
Likewise, Saudi Arabia never dared to halt Iran by conducting a military operation as it 
has done in Bahrain and later in Yemen despite the fact that she was well aware of the 
situation of Iranian militias together with Hezbollah fighters occupying the Syrian stage. 
Mainly, in Syria, the main goal of both Saudi Arabia and Turkey was to get rid of 
the Assad regime, though, in the deep, there have been clear structural divergences that 
Turkey basically advocates for a more inclusive and comprehensive political attendance 
including of the Muslim Brotherhood on the one hand, Saudi Arabia is very concerned 
of the ascendance of the Brotherhood to government. Thus, opposition groups could not 
gain a strong support and were weakened against regime, which prolonged the 
durability of Assad’s power. That is to say, Saudi Arabia’s biased attitude toward 
opposition groups in Syria not only made Turkey’s Syria policy complicated but also 
disabled its Syria policy to get rid of the Iranian influence over Syria, shattering the 
Shia Crescent in one of the important Arab countries.   
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Regional powers, their roles and places in the future configuration of the new world 
order have been burning debates in academia. Consequently, academic studies have 
been paying more attention to the role of regional powers in regionalization but lacking 
in dealing with their projections in respective regions. In this context, SantraDestradi’s 
article “Regional Powers and Their Strategies: Empire, Hegemony and Leadership” is 
a guiding study underpinned by international relations theories for those who are 
interested in exploring the regional projections of regional powers.  
Remembering regional powers’ main feature of leadership role, this point pushed 
me to quest what if there is another regional power whose leadership is contradictory in 
which another regional power aspires regional power role opposite of alleged one. In 
this thesis, I aim to show how two regional powers have carried out contradictory 
policies towards the most transformative and historical developments in the Middle 
East. Thus, this thesis proves that there might be intra-regional challenges that limit 
regional powers’ projections in a region. 
In this thesis, I displayed regional powers’ intra-regional challenges by drawing on 
a comparative analysis of the foreign policy approaches of Turkey and Saudi during the 
Arab Spring which undoubtedly opened up a novel environment for regional powers to 
pursue their regional intentions. Theoretical discussions come up with three projections 
of empire, hegemony and leaderships for regional powers in their responding regions. 
Looking at the power resources of both actors proved that they are neither hegemony 
nor empire but leading countries. Thus, their leadership roles were considered in this 
paper. 
Keeping the Middle East’s multipolar structure in mind, Saudi Arabia and Turkey 
collaterally worked together in order to build up a more stable region before the Arab 
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Spring. Yet, the Arab Spring caused the rethinking of geopolitical considerations which 
deepened cleavages among the regional actors. Considering withdrawal of the United 
States together with the small power gap among the actors influencing the regional 
balance of power and the interconnections finding a mutual way between actors in 
regionally unfolding developments were getting harder.  
The Arab Spring has brought an unprecedented bottom-up dynamism to the Middle 
East in which democratization and human rights oriented governance were the main 
focus. This situation also signals the reshaping of the geopolitical balances of the 
Middle East. In this tectonic and remotely volatile environment, Turkey asserted its own 
projections, taking side with the democratization and people’s legitimate demand, 
supporting regime and government change for mentioned directions.  On the contrary, 
Saudi Arabia, who has seen the political Islamist movement as a survival threat together 
with the Arab Spring itself, pragmatically approached the developments with different 
considerations, both supporting regime change and doing its utmost in order to maintain 
existent regimes and governments in Egypt and in Bahrain.   
Turkey’s active stance supporting regime and government change was signaling the 
break up with Turkey’s traditional foreign policy of non-intervention or non-dealing 
with Middle Eastern developments. This has been directly tied up with Turkey’s 
emergence as an assertive and active regional power. This assertiveness coincided with 
Turkey’s accelerated economic growth and increasing acceptance as role model country 
through its accordance between Islam and democracy in its political realm. Yet, this 
assertiveness was confronted with intra-regional actors’ intention to narrow down 
Turkey’s maneuverability in the region.  
In the multipolar region, the leadership role might confront substantial obstacles 
and this thesis mainly shows how Turkey’s democratization oriented foreign policy 
approach was undermined by Saudi Arabia. Since the inception of the Arab Spring, 
Turkey supported democratization and even regime and government change in this way. 
Yet, Saudi Arabia’s active role in the count-revolutionary movement in Bahrain and in 
Egypt, and its “frenemy” position in Syria, have been intra-regional constraint to 
Turkey from another regional power. 
The Arab Spring’s arrival to Egypt was a breakthrough moment for the fate of the 
revolutionary political wave. Egypt is the heart of Arab lands and the repercussions of a 
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change in this country would be unforeseeable for the region. In this context, Saudi 
Arabia never desired for Hosni Mobarak’s to leave his power whereas Turkey urged 
him to resign. This was only a small part of the contradictory leaderships between 
Turkey and Saudi Arabia over Egypt. In following times, what was most feared by 
Saudi Arabia happened in Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood took over the government 
after the first free elections held in Egyptian history. Turkey, as supposedly, welcomed 
this democratic transformation because the country was expecting a replication of 
Turkey’s Muslim identity’s accordance with democratic consolidation in a pro-eminent 
Arabic country so as to reach out stability in the region. 
Yet, the first elected President Morsi has been toppled down with a military coup 
conducted by General Abdul Fattah Sisi. This surfaced a great confrontation and made 
apparent the competition between Saudi Arabia and Turkey since the latter was 
speaking out against the military coup on the international stage while the former was 
canalizing economic aid to cement military coup’s implementation. The Egyptian issue 
was the clearest example of how two regional powers can curb each other in presenting 
their regional projections.  
Bahrain was another important issue displaying the limitation of regional powers. 
Even though Turkey’s effective dealing with the developments around the Gulf 
countries were limited, glancing at Turkey and Saudi Arabia’s approaches in this county 
was important in the context of the emergence of Sunni axis allegations, as well. Saudi 
Arabia erected as a sub-regional hegemonic power over the Gulf countries and it 
dispatched its military equipment to Bahrain in order to crack down protests. This is 
where Turkey has been harshly slammed for lashing out Saudi Arabia’s intervention 
and accused of following Sunni oriented foreign policy. In fact, Turkey realistically 
approached the situation in Bahrain and confessed its limitation which was the actual 
reason behind degrading its voice.  
The Syrian crisis was another competition place in which Saudi Arabia and Turkey 
seemed as if they were acting together with the aim of toppling down the Assad regime. 
Yet, deeper glance at the situation on the ground and the approaches that both actors 
carried out shows us differentiations. These differentiations stemmed from the 
divergence in thinking for post-Assad period. Despite the fact that Saudi Arabia’s main 
aim of toppling down Assad was to curb Iran’s penetration, Turkey was aiming to build 
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an an inclusive democratic consolidation in which Islamist groups might have been 
preeminent actors. Saudi Arabia’s concern made it harder to achieve any convergence 
with Turkey and the longer they did not agree on a mutual way the more the conflict 
prolonged in Syria.  
This thesis solely focused on the contradictory leaderships of Saudi Arabia and 
Turkey in the most transformative period of the Middle East, namely the Arab Spring. 
This has been a great chance for Turkey to promote democratic values as Muslim 
country and a substantial challenge for Saudi Arabia both in domestic and regional 
geopolitical contexts. Nevertheless, the ensuing period of that saw emergence of 
terrorist organizations along with Iran’s clear indication to penetrate into the Arab world 
as recently seen in Yemen, have created an area of convergence between Turkey and 
Saudi Arabia. This is related to the balance of power in the region and this competition 
could be turned into cooperation in relation with the balance of power.  
Finally, this thesis proved the intra-regional challenges of regional powers. In the 
broader context, the concept of regional powers pushes us to think of the limits of 
regional powers in three spheres; domestic, regional and global. Domestic limitation of 
a regional power is directly related to its liberal basis of leadership which is dependent 
on the will of domestic decision makers, ranging from small elites to the national will. 
Regional limitation of a regional power stems from another regional power’s regional 
projections, as demonstrated in this thesis. Lastly, a regional power would be limited by 
superpowers whose influence, coerciveness and appealing, to some extent, would be 
more dominant than regional powers. For Turkey’s regional power limitations, a PhD 
thesis that simultaneously focuses on the domestic, regional and global limitations of 
the country with in-depth interviews with political parties’ foreign policy 
representatives and analyses of other regional powers projections together with global 
superpowers’ considerations to the responding region might be very illuminative as well 
as contributive for future academic studies. 
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